Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Krishna Prakash Gupta
Jayne Werner
Basile Kerblay

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1982

CHURCH IN POLAND
Jan Nowak

Kremlin Politics
William G. Hyland

1979 Soviet Census
Murray Feshbach

USSR and Pakistan
William E. Griffith



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Problems of Communism

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Cover: Part of a crowd of nearly 300,000 Poles that assembled in Gdansk on December 16, 1980, to dedicate a monument in memory of worker casualties of December 1970 in the Baltic seaport city. Photo by Marc Bulka/Gamma-Liaison.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

The Church in Poland
Jan Nowak

The Catholic Church in Poland has successfully resisted subjugation by the Communist regime and has the respect and allegiance of the vast majority of Poles. Since the late 1960's, the church has used this position increasingly to defend the principle of human rights, not only for itself, but for all groups in Polish society. Whether the church will be able to perform a mediator role in resolving the current situation will hinge on the military government's willingness to engage in a genuine dialogue with the social forces represented by Solidarity.

Kto Kogo in the Kremlin
William G. Hyland

Soviet politics basically consists of a struggle for power. Mikhail Suslov's death highlights the mortality of the present oligarchy, and a struggle for power among Leonid Brezhnev's epigones is to be expected when he goes. Determining who the principal actors are and where they stand helps answer a fundamental question: what are Soviet policies likely to be in the 1980's? Foreign policy is now in flux, and the stage is set for a struggle over defense policy after Brezhnev. It will matter greatly how these issues fit into the internal power struggle.

Between the Lines of the 1979 Soviet Census
Murray Feshbach

Significantly absent from data published by the USSR on its 1979 population census are figures on age distribution. A reconstruction of partial data on this aspect of the populace suggests serious problems of aging, a continued abnormal shortage of males, excess male mortality, concentration of the highest fertility rates and greatest proportions of young people in the Muslim areas of the USSR, and even the possibility of stagnation or decline of the total population in the 21st century. It will take decades to correct these problems, if it can be done at all. This may explain Soviet delays in releasing census data.

The USSR and Pakistan
William E. Griffith

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought the Soviet army for the first time to the borders of Pakistan. Since then, Moscow has sought to intimidate Pakistan, for the Soviet leadership regards the present Pakistani government as one of its principal obstacles to crushing the Afghan rebels. This policy is likely to continue in light of Moscow's apparent determination to suppress the Afghan rebellion by military force, however long that takes.

(Essay-reviews on next page)

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Essay-Reviews

Mao's Uncertain Legacy

Krishna Prakash Gupta

Current Chinese efforts to distinguish between a "good" and a "bad" Mao Zedong severely distort the nature of this passionate historical protagonist. Yet this practice has now been almost unconsciously assimilated even by professional China watchers in the West. A sounder approach would be to recognize that the contradictory aspects of Mao are inherent and inseparable parts of the same personality.

Women and Revolution: China and Vietnam

Jayne Werner

Revolutionary turmoil in China and Vietnam has dramatically changed the role of women in those societies. Nevertheless, the expectation that revolutionary regimes—particularly in China—would proceed to the full economic "liberation" of women has proven vain. Women still are valued as producers of new manpower, still work in less remunerative jobs (especially in agriculture), and often do not have an equal say with men in the dispensing of income within families.

Social Inequality in the USSR

Basile Kerblay

A close look at Soviet society reveals that for all its claims to the contrary, the Communist government has not really eliminated social inequality. Continued wage inequality is compounded by inequality of privilege and of access to higher education. Historically, the intelligentsia has moved from opposing to embodying state power. It is unclear whether the working class of the Soviet Union is developing a collective self-consciousness.

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The Church in Poland

by Jan Nowak

No one would deny the importance of the Catholic Church in Polish society. Long recognized by Poles of all religious and political persuasions, this importance impressed itself on the rest of the world in the course of the last two years. Pictures of striking Polish workers wearing a cross around their necks or participating in religious services became a familiar sight. Now that the Polish government is repressing the workers' movement by military force, the press carefully watches for reactions by Polish church leaders. It reports any meeting between them and Polish government officials, even though little is known about the substance of these meetings.

To understand the present position of the church in Poland, it is useful to focus on its historic role there as well as on its interaction with the Communist government established after World War II. For purposes of analysis, this interaction can be broken down into three different phases: (1) the 1948–56 period, during which the church fought off attempts by the government to destroy it as an independent institution; (2) the 1956–70 period, during which the church successfully resisted the government's efforts to circumscribe religious and educational activities; and (3) the 1970–81 period, during which the church insisted on the unhindered exercise of religious rights and came to be the rallying point and defender as well of those who demanded the free exercise of all human rights.

Whether the imposition of martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981, will once again threaten the independence of the church remains to be seen. It is useful, however, to keep in mind the words of Leszek Kolakowski, who, in the summer of 1979, accurately predicted "an uncontrollable surge of strikes" in Poland and speculated about possible aftermaths:

And if it is feasible to smash 30 or so uncensored. . . journals and to gaol a few thousand active people, it is not possible with internal repressive instruments to destroy the most powerful crystallizing force of social consciousness to resist the Sovietization process and the most powerful source of moral authority, viz. the Catholic Church.[1]

This unique position of the church has roots which go far back into the Polish past. A few highlights from that 1000-year history might help to explain more recent events.

The Church in Polish History

In 1966, the celebrations by the church of the millennium of Christianity in Poland reached their peak. Rival celebrations staged by the regime of the millennium of the Polish state did not quite capture the popular imagination. Although the church celebrations focused on religious themes, the evocations of historical events could not help but be a reminder of the role of the church in the formation of the Polish state.

Every Polish school child knows that Duke Mieszko I of the Piast dynasty consolidated several loose tribes into the first Polish state. Mieszko married a Czech princess from the ruling Christian dynasty in Bohemia, and in 966, he and members of his court were baptized Christians. His acceptance of Christianity helped him to consolidate the state internally and externally. Catholic missionaries introduced the West European cultural heritage into Poland and raised the administrative level of

Mr. Nowak is an expert and commentator on East European affairs, who has published in a number of journals, including New Leader. *From 1952 until 1976, he served as director of the Polish Division of Radio Free Europe in Munich.*

[1] Leszek Kolakowski, "Emergence of the Opposition: Introduction," *Survey* (London), Autumn 1979, Part 1 of two special issues on Poland, pp. 3–4. Kolakowski, now a Polish émigré, is a former Marxist intellectual.

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Catholic priests celebrate mass and hear confession of workers in Gdansk's Lenin Shipyard on August 29, 1980, during the strike that gave birth to the Solidarity trade union movement.

—Keystone.

the new state. In external affairs, Poland acquired prestige through acceptance into the Christian family of nations.

Equally remembered is that the church organization introduced in Poland at this time was under the direct jurisdiction of the Holy See in Rome rather than being dependent on an episcopal see in the (German) Holy Roman Empire. Thus, an independent Polish state came into being at the same time as an independent Polish bishopric was established at Gniezno.[2]

Another part of the historical tradition is that only one violent clash took place between Polish secular and ecclesiastical authorities—in the 11th century. In a conflict over ecclesiastical prerogatives, as well as over state orientation, Stanislaw, Archbishop of Cracow, sided with the nobles opposed to King Boleslaw II, the Bold. The king had the archbishop killed in 1079. However, this sacrilege forced the monarch to flee the country, and he died in exile shortly thereafter. Eventually, Stanislaw was canonized by the Catholic Church and is a patron saint of Poland. Boleslaw the Bold is remembered as a hothead. (It is worth noting that the visit of Pope John Paul to Poland in 1979 came on the 900th anniversary of the martyrdom of St. Stanislaw, which the Polish church was solemnly commemorating.)

During the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century, the widespread reformation movement in Poland, unlike that in other European states, did not precipitate civil wars over religion. Moreover, the Catholic Counter-reformation in Poland, although—and perhaps because—it regained the allegiance of most Protestant Poles in the course of the 17th century, did not institute an inquisition or burn heretics. In fact, after 1572, the elected Polish monarchs promised in their coronation oaths to uphold the right of their citizens to freedom of worship.[3] Thanks to this relative toleration, the Roman Catholic Church did not acquire a divisive image among Poles, as it did to some extent among other European

[2] For background information, see *Chrzesciajanstwo w Polsce* (Christianity in Poland), Lublin, 1980; *Historia Kosciola w Polsce* (The History of the Church in Poland), Warsaw, 1979.

[3] On this subject, see Françoise Le Moal, "Tolerance in Poland," *The Tradition of Polish Ideals,* London, Orbis Books, 1981, pp. 52–84; and Wiktor Weintraub, "Tolerance and Intolerance in Old Poland," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Ottawa), Spring 1971, p. 21.

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peoples, such as the Czechs and Germans.

When, at the end of the 18th century, Poland lost its political independence and was being partitioned among its three neighbors—Austria, Russia, and Prussia—the church was one of the links which maintained the sense of nationhood across dividing frontiers. In the part of Poland under Russian rule, religious differences between Orthodox Russians and Roman Catholic Poles helped to shield the national identity against Russification. After the Polish insurrection of 1863 in particular, the Russian government attempted to strike back at the Poles through their church, by resorting to curtailment of religious instruction in schools, the reduction of enrollments in Catholic seminaries, and the enlistment of priests to the government's side.[4] In the portion of Poland under Prussian control, Roman Catholicism also separated the Poles from the Lutheran Germans. Subsequently, when the German states were unified under Prussian leadership and Germany's chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, launched the anti-Catholic "Kulturkampf" (1871–83) in the German Empire, the Polish Archbishop of Gniezno was jailed. He even received his cardinal's hat while in a Prussian prison.[5] Thus, the church shared the fate of its people during the partition period.

The Polish state reconstituted after World War I was—like its pre-partition predecessor—a multiethnic and multireligious entity, but the ties between religion and nationality were closer among Poles than among other Europeans except perhaps the Irish. These ties were formalized in the interwar Polish republic by constitutional conferral on the Roman Catholic Church of favored status as the majority denomination of the population. It also became public practice to view religious affiliation as largely synonymous with national identity. Thus, on the eve of World War II, Poland's approximately 35 million inhabitants were identified as follows by religion: 22.3 million Roman Catholics (Poles and Lithuanians); 3.5 million Greek Catholics (predominantly Ukrainians); 4 million Orthodox (Belorussians and Ukrainians); 1.1 million Protestants (German and some Poles); and 3.4 million Jews.[6]

After World War II and the postwar territorial settlement, Poland became in many ways a different country. By 1945, its population had been reduced to only 22.7 million. The eastern area, where the prewar Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian populations had been concentrated, were annexed by the Soviet Union. Those claiming Polish nationality in these areas were resettled within the new Polish frontiers. In the west, Poland received formerly German territories up to the Oder-Neisse rivers under the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. Most of the Germans living there fled or were deported to West Germany.

The Polish Catholic Church had likewise suffered staggering losses during World War II. Of the 12,000 priests and members of religious orders in the prewar church, approximately 2,500 were either executed by the Nazis or put into concentration camps.[7] Many of those who survived the war were debilitated for the rest of their lives. More than 200 churches were destroyed. The Polish seminaries had been closed, so that new priests could be trained only clandestinely. (This is how Karol Wojtyla, now Pope John Paul II, received his seminary training.)

However, the Polish Catholic Church emerged from the war with its authority perhaps greater than ever. No Polish bishops or priests had collaborated with the Nazis. The church had shared the sufferings imposed on the Polish nation, and many priests had participated in the resistance movement.

Avoiding Subjugation

Today, Poland has surpassed its prewar population of 35 million. But it is now a state virtually homogeneous in nationality and religion. Nearly 99 percent of the population identify themselves as Poles, and more than 93 percent have been baptized as Catholics.[8]

The number of clergy and religious has doubled since 1945. There are now approximately 20,000 priests and 80 bishops. Poland's 27 dioceses divide into 7,600 parishes, each serving 4,300 faithful, on the average. Children receive religious instruction in more than 21,000 catechism classes, which are held in churches, parish buildings, and private homes.[9] Vocations to the priesthood have been increasing. In 1980, nearly 6,300 seminarians were studying in the 46 seminaries in Poland.[10] The only Catholic university between the Elbe River in the west and Vladivostok in the east is located in Lublin. In general, one may claim that the Catholic Church exudes greater dynamism in Poland than in any

[4] For background information, see Piotr Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918*, Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1974.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ryszard Bender, "The World War and Independent Poland," in *Chrzescijanstwo w Polsce*, pp. 271–95.

[7] *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, pp. 161 and 194.

[8] Witold Zdaniewicz, *Kosciol Katolicki w Polsce 1945–1978* (The Catholic Church in Poland, 1945–78), Poznan-Warsaw, Pallotinium, 1979, p. 21.

[9] *Pro Mundi Vita* (Brussels), July-August 1980; statistics based on information from the Press Office of the Polish Episcopate. For more detailed statistics on the Polish church, see Witold Zdaniewicz, op. cit.

[10] Polish Episcopate Press Office, Bulletin No. 7, 1981.

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other Catholic country in the world, not to speak of the other East European countries in the Soviet bloc.[11]

How can one account for this tremendous vitality of the Catholic Church in Poland? Why was the Polish Communist regime, backed by Moscow and possessing a monopoly of the instruments of coercion, unable to subjugate the church? To find some explanation, it is necessary to review briefly the position of the Polish Communist regime and the stance of the church, especially in the early years of Communist rule in Poland, between 1945 and 1956.

[11] In July 1981, the Polish weekly *Kulisy* (Warsaw) published the results of a confidential public opinion survey on the Polish people's confidence in 15 different institutions and organizations. The poll was taken in May 1981 by the Center for Public Opinion Research of the Polish Radio. It was conducted with a random sample of men and women over the age 15. Each respondent could offer more than one vote of confidence. The church placed first, with 94 percent; the Solidarity trade union movement came next, with 90 percent; the militia and the Polish Communist party placed at the bottom, with 24 and 32 percent respectively. See Charles J. Gans in *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), July 6, 1981.

To begin with, it must be remembered that the Communists in Poland were in a relatively weaker position than those in the other East European countries which came under Soviet domination after World War II. The prewar Polish Communist party had been extensively purged on Stalin's orders and had actually been dissolved in 1938. Few of the prewar party leaders were available in 1944 when Moscow sponsored a pro-Soviet Polish Government of National Liberation, the so-called Lublin Committee. The Communists who had remained in Poland during the war had only a weak popular base created through their anti-Nazi resistance organization. (Poles had overwhelmingly joined the Home Army resistance movement, which was under the direction of the Polish government-in-exile in London.) In 1945, there were no more than 30,000 Communist party members in Poland. Thus, the Lublin Committee faced a hostile population which considered the Communists to be agents and instruments of Russian domination.

Prayers are offered in the Wroclaw cathedral on May 3, 1970, at the opening of a session of the Polish episcopate marking the 25th anniversary of the establishment by the Polish Catholic Church of its church organizations in the Western and Northern Territories. From left to right, Archbishop Antoni Baraniak from Poznan, Karol Cardinal Wojtyla (the future Pope John Paul II) from Cracow, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski (Primate of Poland and president of the episcopate), Archbishop Boleslaw Kominek from Wroclaw, and Bishop Piotr Kalwa from Lublin.

—CAF via Eastfoto.

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Furthermore, the Polish Communists could not avail themselves of some of the means for discrediting their opposition used by their East European comrades. Poland had, after all, been an Allied power during World War II; sizable Polish units had fought on the Allied side against the Nazis; and no Polish political groups had collaborated with the Nazis.[12]

Under these circumstances, the Communists had to proceed cautiously in trying to establish and consolidate their position. During the first three years, they relied on force, especially against the Polish Home Army, and on various pressures as well as co-optation, against the political opposition. By the end of 1948, the Communists had achieved complete control over the government. The membership of the Communist party—called the Polish United Workers' Party after the numerically much stronger Polish Socialist Party had been maneuvered into a merger—had risen to approximately 1.25 million. Within the party, the strongly pro-Moscow faction was gaining ground while the more independent Communists, such as Wladyslaw Gomulka, were being purged. (However, in contrast to their counterparts in other East European states, the pro-Moscow faction never felt sufficiently strong to stage major trials of deviant Communists.[13]) Nevertheless, by the end of 1948, the Polish Communists felt ready to undertake a "socialist" transformation of society according to the Soviet model and to take on any remaining ideological adversaries, such as the Catholic Church.

During the early postwar years, the Communist authorities in Poland (as well as elsewhere in Eastern Europe) had—out of a combination of ambiguity and weakness—left the church relatively unmolested. The 1925 Concordat with the Vatican, which regulated church-state relations in Poland, was annulled. Otherwise, however, the authorities did not take any major steps with regard to the church.

In 1945, Cardinal August Hlond, the Primate of Poland, received broad powers from Pope Pius XII. The pope had granted such powers to some heads of churches that had come under Communist domination in 1939–40, in order to ensure that the church organization could continue to function even if communications with the Vatican were broken. Although the exact extent of these powers is not generally known, it seems clear that in the absence of an accredited papal nuncio, the Primate functioned as the representative of the pope. The Primate also acquired greater powers with respect to the church organization and appointments than he had previously possessed. In sum, the Primate became something more than the first among equals: he was very much the head of the episcopate.

Primate Hlond lost no time in using these powers to introduce Polish church administrators in the formerly German territories and to build up the church organization there.[14] In addition, in 1946 he elevated to Bishop of Lublin a little-known priest who was devoted to pastoral concerns. Before his death, Cardinal Hlond recommended this bishop to the pope to succeed as Primate. This was Stefan Wyszynski, who was named Primate in September 1948.[15] His towering personality came to dominate the Polish scene until his death in 1981.

The new Primate was greeted with a fierce antichurch campaign of slander and distortion by the authorities aimed at the pope, the Vatican, and the "reactionary part of the clergy." But the regime did not limit itself to propaganda. In 1945, an organization of "progressive Catholics," named PAX, had been created. Its founder, Boleslaw Piasecki, former leader of the prewar fascist organization "Falanga," had bought his life in Soviet prison by in effect offering to be a Trojan horse among Poland's Catholics. The Christian label was adopted by PAX to create an opposition of Catholic believers against the hierarchy from within the Catholic community.[16] Now, with the help of PAX, the nucleus of a "patriot priests" movement was formed in 1949. The state authorities also decreed the confiscation of "Caritas," the charity organization of the church, which owned more than 2,000 hospitals, nursing homes, and orphanages. These were placed under the direction of the patriot priests. Another decree, on "protection of religious freedom and freedom of conscience," made the application of ecclesiastical sanctions against priests or laymen who collaborated with the regime a crime punishable by up to five years in prison.[17]

Henceforth, the Primate and the episcopate had to

[12] M. K. Dziewanowski, *Poland in the 20th Century*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1977, pp. 113–44.

[13] Ibid., p. 168; see also the excellent discussion of Poland and other East European countries in Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1969.

[14] Cardinal August Hlond returned from exile on July 25, 1945, with full power of the pope's legate "in tutto il territorio polacco" (in all Polish territories). On August 15, 1945, Hlond introduced Polish church administration in the former German lands, which he divided into five territorial units. Five apostolic delegates were appointed and granted the jurisdiction of residentiary bishops.

[15] Andrzej Micewski, "Cardinal Wyszynski," unpublished manuscript, p. 73; this manuscript is to be published in *Éditions du Dialogue* (Paris), in 1982. See also Peter Raina, *Kardynal Wyszynski* (Cardinal Wyszynski), London, Publishing House of Poets and Painters, Vol. 1, 1979, p. 295. Raina had access to the archives of the Primate's Institute in Warsaw.

[16] On PAX, see Lucjan Blit, *The Eastern Pretender*, London, Hutchinson, 1965; Radio Free Europe, *Prawda o PAXie i Piaseckim* (The Truth About PAX and Piasecki), London, 1968; and Andrzej Micewski, *Katolische Gruppierungen in Polen* (Catholic Organizations in Poland), Munich, Kaiser Verlag, 1978.

[17] Decree of Aug. 5, 1949, published in *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), Aug. 7, 1949.

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The late Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, Primate of Poland, ordains new priests in Warsaw's St. John Cathedral.

—DPA via Pictorial Parade.

rely on their personal moral authority and appeals to maintain discipline among the clergy. The regime began to apply coercion against clergy who would not collaborate. Several hundred priests were arrested. Six were sentenced to death for alleged "political crimes." Those who had something to conceal in their private life, particularly priests who were guilty of violating their celibacy vows or of sexual abuses, were threatened with public exposure unless they joined the patriot priests. Such outright blackmail worked in some cases. In others, the priests were lured into cooperation by bribes or local concessions and privileges.[18]

Primate Wyszynski reacted with vigorous protests directly to the authorities, and with pastoral letters and sermons. The regime responded by threats to arrest on the spot any priests who read the Primate's statements in their churches. As a consequence, the pastoral letters were read in only one Warsaw church, by Wyszynski himself. However, his sermons and pronouncements reached the Poles because they were broadcast back to Poland by Radio Free Europe. Similarly, distortions in the regime's antichurch propaganda were exposed by Western radio broadcasts.

While escalating its subversion and propaganda campaign, the regime also applied pressure to Primate Wyszynski and the episcopate to conclude an agreement on state-church relations. This pressure was increased after Pope Pius XII issued a statement in July 1949 which was interpreted to mean that all Catholics who collaborated with Communists would be subject to excommunication.[19]

Primate Wyszynski was aware that similar pressures had already been applied by the Communist authorities on Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, the Primate of Hungary, and on Archbishop Josef Beran of Prague. Mindszenty and Beran were denied the right to exercise their episcopal functions and were interned. In both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, bishops, priests, and laymen were arrested, pro-regime priests were put into positions of ecclesiastical authority, and the state came in effect to control the church organization.[20] Hoping to avoid a similar fate for the Polish church, or at least to gain time, Wyszynski and the episcopate—despite some dissension—signed an "understanding" with the Polish state in April 1950.[21]

Wyszynski managed to overcome the aversion to the agreement within the Polish episcopate. Despite a clause in the understanding stating that the church would not oppose a voluntary collectivization of agriculture, the Polish peasantry, undoubtedly the staunchest supporters of the church, did not seem to be alienated from it. While the Vatican clearly disapproved of the understanding, especially since it contained a clause committing the Polish episcopate to urge the Vatican to give permanent and regular status to the Polish church organization introduced in the formerly German territories, the Vatican did not speak out publicly against it.[22] In fact, in 1952, Primate Wyszynski was elevated to the rank of cardinal.

Thus, the expectations of the regime that the understanding might be a useful tool for the application of "salami tactics" to the Polish church were not realized. Therefore, the authorities came to resort more and more to repressive means. In 1953, four bishops were imprisoned, and four others were forbidden to exercise their office. A newly published decree made all church appointments, transfers, or changes in pastoral jurisdic-

[18] Techniques for recruiting patriot priests were decribed in detail by former PAX member Andrzej Micewski in *Wspolrzadzic czy nie klamac* (To Co-Govern or Not to Lie), Paris, Libella, 1978, pp. 42–43.

[19] *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* (Vatican), July 13, 1949.

[20] Hansjakob Stehle, *Eastern Politics of the Vatican, 1917–1979*, Athens, OH, Ohio University Press, 1981, pp. 268 ff.

[21] For the full text, see Hansjakob Stehle, *The Independent Satellite*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1965.

[22] Stehle, *Eastern Politics of the Vatican*, p. 276.

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tion subject to prior approval by the government. In effect, the regime acquired the right of church appointments at the recommendation of bishops.[23] The same decree empowered the authorities to remove clergymen from their posts.

On this issue, Cardinal Wyszynski decided to confront the regime. From his pulpit he declared: "We teach that it is proper to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God that which is God's. But when Caesar seats himself on the altar, we respond curtly: he may not."[24] In a strong letter to the party leader, Boleslaw Bierut, the episcopate listed all acts of persecution and declared: "We shall rather leave them [church positions] vacant . . . than surrender spiritual authority to the unworthy. . . . Similarly, if faced with the choice of handing over ecclesiastical jurisdiction to be an instrument of secular authorities or of accepting personal sacrifices, we shall not hesitate."[25]

The rejection of the decree on church appointments and the refusal to condemn a bishop sentenced to 12 years in prison precipitated the arrest of Cardinal Wyszynski in September 1953. The Polish episcopate was faced with an ultimatum: to elect as chairman of the episcopate a bishop proposed by the government or to share the fate of the Primate. With one dissenting voice, they agreed. A statement—dictated by the authorities to the bishops—implying condemnation of the imprisoned Primate and promising cooperation with the government was read under duress in all churches.[26]

It was the hope of the regime that the removal of the Primate would make possible a rapid expansion of the patriot priest movement. The attitude of the faithful frustrated these plans. Such priests were ostracized by their flocks. This spontaneous boycott was so massive and effective that the patriot priests were often left without parishioners and without financial support as well. Even not so steadfast priests, when faced with conflicting pressures from the regime and the people, preferred to resist the regime rather than to face general contempt. The names of the few recruits to the patriot priests were widely publicized as examples to be followed by others. But the number of active patriot priests never exceeded 400–500.[27] The overwhelming majority of the clergy remained united and loyal to the imprisoned Primate. In one case, a priest who was threatened with public exposure of his old love affair, confessed it publicly after Sunday service and asked his parishioners whether they still wished him to remain their pastor. That day, he became their idol, and blackmailers left him alone.[28]

Years later, Cardinal Wyszynski summarized what happened after his removal: "Strike the shepherd, and the sheep will scatter. Often this has been tried and proven to be so. But whenever it has been done in Poland, it has served only to draw the sheep together."[29]

One cannot explain how the Church withstood infiltration and subversion without understanding the various forms of resistance offered by the population. In this period of Stalinism, society was atomized by fear, and mutual suspicion was sown by informers who spied on neighbors, friends, and even family members. Not only were organized forms of resistance impossible, but even informal social links became attenuated. The Polish resistance in these times took on a largely passive form. The educated class withdrew like snails inside the walls of their houses. The output of the mass media and the regime's writers and artists was so bad and so widely ignored that finally party and nonparty intellectuals rebelled against producing it. The public simply refused to read the official newspapers and books or to listen to the domestic radio.

In the economic realm, workers reduced their labor efficiency to the minimum necessary to avoid reprisals. The cumulative effect of this behavior led to the failure of the 1949–55 economic plan. Lower-echelon officials, charged with carrying out the government plans, quietly changed sides and sabotaged implementation, especially of forcible collectivization of the peasantry and antichurch policies.[30] The Communist rulers discovered suddenly that their instruments of power were blunted,

[23] Decree of Feb. 9, 1956. See *Dziennik Ustaw* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1953.

[24] The sermon delivered on June 4, 1953, as quoted in Adam Michnik, *Kosciol, Lewica, Dialog* (The Church, the Left, and the Dialogue), Paris, Literary Institute, 1977, p. 44. A French translation of this work, *l'Église et la Gauche—le dialogue Polonais*, was published by Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1979.

[25] For the full text, see Raina, op. cit., pp. 497–525.

[26] See ibid., pp. 553–54.

[27] P. J. Babris, *Silent Churches*, Arlington Heights, IL, Research Publishers, 1978, p. 281. Babris quotes an unnamed Polish prelate who estimated that about 400–500 priests had associated themselves with PAX "in one way or another." The present writer, as the director of the Polish Service of Radio Free Europe, forwarded to the Vatican in 1955 a list of 400 "activists" from the ranks of "patriot priests," compiled by RFE Research from the press in Poland. Nearly 1,000 patriot priests were registered as members of ZBOWID (a regime-sponsored organization of former combatants). However, less than half of them were actively involved. Some 4,700 priests participated in meetings throughout the country organized by the authorities in December 1955, but most had been brought by the political police. See *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, p. 210.

[28] From the author's own conversation with a member of the episcopate. It is worth noting that the core of the present clergy (including the current Primate, Jozef Glemp) were trained as clerics in these critical years (1949–55). During the entire 1945–78 period, the number of entrants into seminaries beat all records (they amounted to some 900 in 1950, 1,100 in 1951, 1,050 in 1952, and 1,000 in 1953). Only 200 clerics graduated in 1951, and only 300 each, in 1952 and 1953. See Table 3 in Zdaniewicz, op. cit., p. 38. Most of the seminarians in these years abandoned their vocation under considerable pressure by the political police. Inadvertently, the regime created an elimination system which in the longer run benefited the church. Only the strongest and most determined clerics passed the trial by ordeal.

[29] Sermon in Czestochowa, Press Bureau of the Polish Episcopate, January 1966.

[30] Dziewanowski, op. cit., pp. 169–79.

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and their lines of communication with the masses, broken.

Relaxation of the stringent policies, however, was facilitated by several fortuitous events. First of all, Iosif Stalin had died in March 1953, and the Soviet leadership was in the throes of a succession struggle, eventually won by Nikita Khrushchev. In February 1956, he made his famous "secret speech" denouncing Stalin.

In addition, a high-level member of the Polish secret police defected to the West in 1953. His revelations about the activities of his feared and despised service were broadcast to Poland by Radio Free Europe in 1954–55. They not only brought about further disillusionment among the population but necessitated, in the view of the party, a purge and reorganization of the political police as well as restraint of its activities.[31]

A monument is unveiled in Poznan in June 1981, commemorating workers who participated in the June 1956 demonstrations in that city. Thousands of Poles gathered in Poznan for a commemorative mass on Sunday, June 28.

—Keystone.

The party membership, and especially its intellectuals, gradually were learning the facts about Soviet measures with regard to Poland, even before Khrushchev made his speech. Failure of the 1949–55 economic plan brought out disagreements within the party leadership over policy and erupted into an overt factional struggle. The general sense of discontent eventually culminated in workers' riots in Poznan in June 1956.

Two months later, on August 26, a million pilgrims from all over Poland gathered around the holy shrine of the Madonna in Czestochowa.[32] The religious demonstrations of unprecedented dimension turned into a massive display of support for Poland's imprisoned spiritual leader. In the following months, requests for the release of the Primate figured high on the list of demands raised at mass meetings all over Poland.

When, in October 1956, the revolutionary wave reached its peak, Gomulka, the newly elected party leader (who himself had been recently released from prison), was confronted before the Central Committee building by thousands demanding that the cardinal be set free.[33] Wyszynski was hurriedly brought back to Warsaw from the monastery where he had been detained, to receive a hero's welcome. He was now a celebrity, and his persecution made him virtually immune from rearrest in the future. In his first words to the Warsaw crowds, Wyszynski appealed for peace, calm, and unity.

During his confinement, Wyszynski had refused to negotiate; now he lost no time in opening talks with the government. These led to another "understanding" with the new party leadership. The decree on church appointments was abolished; the government retained its veto power only in cases of residentiary bishops and parish pastors.[34] All imprisoned priests were released, expelled bishops were returned to their dioceses, and optional religion classes were reintroduced into the schools.

Resisting Obstruction

Hostilities between the church and the regime were resumed as soon as the party, under Gomulka, regained control of the situation in Poland. However, the

[31] Brzezinski, op, cit., p. 240.

[32] *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, p. 210.

[33] Stefan Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People," *Scientific American* (New York, NY), July 1981, p. 50.

[34] Decree of Dec. 31, 1956, in *Dziennik Ustaw*, Vol. 1, No. 6, 1957. The new "understanding" concluded on Dec. 8, 1956, allowed priests free access to hospitals and prisons, and permitted expelled nuns to return to their convents.

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church and the Primate were in a stronger position than in 1948. The regime's attempts to revive the patriot priest movement were not effective; PAX had lost its credibility and thus was devoid of much utility in the eyes of the regime. Since Gomulka hoped to limit church influence in society and especially among the young, Marxist indoctrination in schools and atheistic propaganda campaigns were stepped up. Social legislation opposed by the church was introduced (the church objected particularly to the legislation on abortion).

Wyszynski approached these and other problems with his characteristic flexibility. When teaching of religion in public schools was again forbidden, he made verbal protests while ordering the organization of a wide network of Catholic religion classes.

Only when the regime sought to extend its control over the teaching of religion in chapels, parish buildings, and private homes did Wyszynski call for civil disobedience. State inspectors were refused access to Catholic catechism classes. Harassment and discrimination against those who accommodated such classes were strongly protested. When the government banned members of religious orders from teaching catechism, the proscription was ignored. After religion instructors were ordered to be licensed and paid by the state,[35] the church ruled that priests were not permitted to accept remuneration from the government. When, in 1969, ruinous taxes were imposed on parish priests and church property, the clergy was told by the episcopate not to pay them. The regime rarely tried to enforce the law coercively, for fear of violent confrontations with the faithful.

The most serious problem the church faced in this period was the need for more churches. Substantial birthrates in the postwar era together with repatriation and resettlement had added greatly to Poland's population. Moreover, industrialization and the creation of new urban centers were causing millions to move from the countryside to the cities; hence, much of the population had no church within reasonable distance. The regime clearly hoped that removal of the growing working class from contact with priests and churches would result in a gradual atrophy of religion. In most cases, permits to build new churches were denied. When appeals and collective petitions were rejected, the parishioners together with their priests built primitive barracks, chapels, or even churches without waiting for the permits. In many instances, the arrest of the priest and dismantling of an illegally erected church led to demonstrations and local clashes with the police. Persistent



High mass is celebrated at the new church in Nowa Huta, built after years of struggle with Polish state authorities.

—EUPRA.

public pressure usually prevailed, as was the case in the large industrial center of Nowa Huta, where, after years of struggle, a great modern church was finally built.[36]

Friction between the church and the state arose also over a somewhat different issue. Toward the close of the Vatican II Council in 1965, the Polish episcopate sent a letter to the episcopate of West Germany. Although the letter summarized the 1,000-year history of Polish-German relations from a decidedly Polish national perspective, it was at the same time conciliatory and invited the German episcopate to the millennial celebrations at Czestochowa in 1966. The phrase upon which the Polish government pounced in the ensuing antichurch

[35] Decree by the Minister of Education, Aug. 19, 1961. See *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, p. 222.

[36] It seems that the Communist regime was more successful in promoting religious indifference than in fostering atheism. Although in totals of divorces and abortions, Poland still remains far behind most European countries, there is an upward trend in both statistics. As a result of ultraliberal divorce laws, the number of divorces increased from 11,100 in 1950 to 40,300 in 1979. The law introduced in 1956 removing all restrictions on abortions had a similar effect. In 1957, there were 36,400 registered abortions; in 1967, 144,500—or one fourth the number of children born in the year. *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, pp. 200, 204, 233. This discrepancy between the teaching of the church and the moral norms applied in a predominantly Catholic society may indicate growing religious indifference of Catholics.

According to a public poli conducted among clergy in 1971 by the Catholic weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny*, (Cracow), 18.3 percent of respondents considered indifference in religious matters as the main difficulty in their pastoral work. In all, 14 percent complained of the secularization of their flock. See *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, p. 243.

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campaign was: "We forgive and ask forgiveness." This could suggest that the perpetrators of crimes and their victims were placed on the same level of moral guilt. Memories of 6 million dead and of Nazi atrocities were still very much alive in Poland. Thus, Communist propagandists saw a unique opportunity to create a rift between the Polish people, with their nationalistic feelings, and their church. To make matters worse, the response of the German bishops was distorted by the official media through the omission of key words.[37] It seemed that, for the first time, the Primate and the Polish episcopate might be losing public support. The cardinal had to vigorously defend this gesture to the German people.

Eventually, Wyszynski was vindicated by events. Although the Polish hierarchy had been guided by religious considerations, their letter encouraged a conciliatory trend of opinion in West Germany and helped pave the way for the Bonn-Warsaw agreement concluded in 1970. By this agreement, the government in Bonn accepted the Oder-Neisse border with Poland. As a result, the Vatican yielded to the relentless pressure of the Polish church, and the western territories were recognized as an integral and permanent part of Poland and its church administration.

Much of the antichurch propaganda in the mid-1960's was focused on Cardinal Wyszynski personally. He was widely attacked in anonymous letters and pamphlets disseminated by the Polish political police. Forged texts purporting to be his sermons were circulated.[38] There was an attempt to humiliate him before the Second Vatican Council. All the bishops taking part received a memorandum, signed by nonexistent "Polish

[37] For texts of both letters, see *Listy Pasterskie Episkopatu Polski 1945–1974* (Pastoral Letters of the Polish Episcopate), Paris, Éditions du Dialogue, 1975, pp. 829–36.

[38] The last known case of forgery took place in 1974. The Holy Cross sermons, delivered in Holy Cross Church in Warsaw by Cardinal Wyszynski, were published as a book in Rome. A forged version was circulated in Poland. See *Survey*, Autumn 1979, p. 216

Polish pilgrims gather at Jasna Gora in Czestochowa on August 15, 1981, to commemorate the 600th anniversary of the Black Virgin. The sign on the wall reads: "Queen of Poland, pray for us."

—Joseph Czarnecki/Gamma-Liaison.

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priests," which accused him of fostering an exaggerated Marian cult, bordering on heresy.[39]

Wyszynski was also criticized by bona fide Catholic intellectuals for intransigence in dealing with the government and for autocratic tendencies, ultraconservatism, and a reluctance to implement the Vatican Council's reforms. Criticism originating from the respected "Znak" group of Catholic deputies to the Sejm (parliament) found greater credibility in Western Catholic circles than the attacks of Communists.

Nevertheless, in retrospect, there is little doubt that the solidarity of bishops and clergy could not have been maintained without a touch of the qualities for which Wyszynski was criticized. He had very limited means for imposing his policies on others, yet his decisions were obeyed and followed. His advocacy of a people's Catholicism was based on the premise that ordinary working people were more reliable supporters of the church than were Catholic intellectuals. He felt that because the Catholic deputies to parliament from the "Znak" group functioned with the regime's consent, they had a vested interest in pressing the church into concessions and compromises. "The church," Wyszynski told them, "does not need politicians, but confessors and defenders."[40]

The Polish church has often been accused of superficial religiosity, expressed mainly through ritual and external forms of devotion appealing strongly to simple folk but lacking intellectual depth.[41] However, since the church was denied access to the mass media, and even the right to have its own printing facilities,[42] the various religious manifestations, pilgrimages, and rallies of the church represented the only opportunity, aside from regular services, to reach the people directly. The traditional church celebrations also provided millions of people with their only chance to manifest support for their church and opposition to the official state doctrine. Although the cardinal's strong personal faith makes it unthinkable that he was using the Marian cult as a tactical device, nevertheless the deep devotion of Poles to the Holy Virgin of Czestochowa, rooted in a long tradition, played an important role in the survival of Catholicism in Poland.

The reforms of the Vatican II Council were implemented, but the Primate did not allow his critics to dictate the pace of change.[43] In his view, spontaneous reforms from below could have undermined the discipline of the clergy. This would have been dangerous to the church, which was still living under conditions of siege. Thus, the episcopate remained firmly in control of reforms, which were introduced gradually and cautiously.

Defending Human Rights

Since the 1960's, however, the church has gradually evolved its own brand of ecumenism in Poland. It has assumed more and more the role of champion of human rights of all citizens, regardless of their religious affiliation.[44] Even when the church itself has not been attacked, it has raised its voice in protest against the persecution of others. In 1968, when student demonstrations were ruthlessly suppressed, the episcopate collectively and Wyszynski individually strongly condemned police brutality and repressive measures.[45] Two years later, after the workers' revolt in the coastal cities of Poland, the church spoke out in support of workers' rights. The Primate stated publicly that the events of December 1970 aroused the conscience of the nation and galvanized its will to live under more democratic conditions.

In the 1970's, the emphasis on defending human rights became even stronger. The Primate had a formidable ally in Archbishop Karol Wojtyla of Cracow, who became a cardinal in 1967. Although Wojtyla worked in the shadow of Wyszynski in most matters, he grew very outspoken in his public pronouncements in defense of human rights. For example, Wojtyla showed his opposition to the anti-Semitism campaign of Gomulka's regime by encouraging his students to care for neglected and abandoned Jewish cemeteries.

In 1975, another wave of dissent in Poland started with collective letters of protest against proposed changes in the Polish Constitution. The episcopate followed with a separate letter to the authorities, and without tying itself to the protesters, it gave them its support.[46] After another outburst of labor unrest in June

[39] The author saw the original copy.

[40] At a meeting with all five Znak deputies to parliament in May 1968. See Micewski, op. cit., p. 493.

[41] Wyszynski himself, in an interview published in *Przewodnik Katolicki* (Poznan), Sept. 7, 1969, saw the main features of Polish Catholicism to be the Marian cult, emotionality, tradition, and massive displays (*masowosc*) of religious feelings. See *Historia Kosciola w Polsce*, p. 238.

[42] The censorship did not allow the printing of missals in the vernacular, which were necessary for the introduction of the Vatican Council's liturgical reforms. The Pallotines printed 24,000 copies in Paris, but shipment was stopped by Polish customs authorities. Eventually, the publisher in Paris was allowed to mail single copies to individual addressees. See Babris, op. cit., p. 272.

[43] The episcopate defended its implementation of the reforms of the Second Ecumenical Council in a pastoral letter of Oct. 17, 1966, to the clergy. For a full text, see *Listy Pasterskie Episkopatu Polski*, pp. 453–69.

[44] The evolution in the church's position on human rights is discussed extensively in Michnik, op. cit.

[45] Letters of Mar. 21 and May 3, 1968, from the episcopate.

[46] *Dissent in Poland 1976–77*, London, Association of Polish Students and Graduates in Exile, 1977, pp. 19, 147.

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1976, the church again took a strong stand and demanded leniency for the workers who were being jailed or fired after the demonstrations.[47]

It took some time for radical and liberal intellectuals to recognize this new ecumenical role of the church. The left-wing intellectual elite, numerically small but highly articulate and influential, were traditionally anticlerical and inclined to identify the church with right-wing nationalism.[48] Marxist dissidents who wanted a "socialism with a human face" remained hostile to the church, even though they may have broken with the Communist party. To them, the Catholic Church seemed to represent only another brand of totalitarianism.

A change in attitude by the intellectuals came in the late 1970's. It is exemplified by Adam Michnik, one of the young leaders of the Committee for the Defense of the Workers (KOR). Michnik, an avowed atheist and a target of the 1968 anti-Zionist campaign, concluded that the prevailing attitude of intellectuals was mistaken. The church, wrote Michnik, had become the most formidable opponent of the totalitarian system. As such, it was the mainstay of all people fighting for greater freedom, be they believers or nonbelievers. Similar ideas were expressed in the many uncensored publications which mushroomed in Poland after 1976.[49]

The church has reaffirmed on numerous occasions its commitment to promoting all human rights. Primate Wyszynski articulated his views on this subject clearly in a letter written in 1978 to Kazimierz Kakol, director of the Department of Religious Affairs:

The defense of one's right . . . is simply the duty of the citizen . . . any category of citizens who share the sense of responsibility for the fate of the state must see it. They must make their voices heard even if they have to pay for it dearly. There is today no one in Poland exempt from the duty of speaking the truth. He who keeps silent is a potential wrecker of the state and society.[50]

The former archbishop of Cracow, speaking to his compatriots after his election as Pope John Paul II, said:

The love of our country must unite all of us despite and over all our differences. I address these words to all my compatriots who respect the outlook and convictions of others, without exception.[51]

Fully conscious of his strong position, Wyszynski was relentless in pressing his demands. Yet he always knew where to stop. He did not hesitate to ask the faithful to disobey secular authorities whenever he felt that secular laws and decisions endangered the essential mission of the church. At the same time, he always tried to keep at a safe distance from the brink. He was aware that the memories of 1956—and the risk of violent confrontation—had a restraining influence on his Communist adversaries; but he never threatened such confrontations. In his dealings with the government, Wyszynski carefully walked the thin line between compromise and resistance. He never let the church be identified with a particular social or economic system, and his criticisms were never aimed at communism per se or at a specific leader. They were directed at abuses. The Primate preached:

. . . let no one think that the Bishops embarked on a struggle against the system. No, they only recalled the rights of Man, of the family and citizens in their country. These are the only objectives that guide us. We cannot accept comments, appearing in particular in the foreign press, which scent political motives in everything we do.[52]

The position of the church as a unifying link and crystallizing factor in Polish society was graphically illustrated during the pope's visit to Poland in 1979. A future historian might describe the drama which took place in Warsaw on June 2, 1979, as a climax in the life of the 1,000-year-old Polish nation. Pope John Paul II, a Pole and the first non-Italian successor to St. Peter since 1523, was in the capital of his homeland, which is ruled by Communists and controlled by Moscow. He was celebrating a pontifical mass in the open air. A huge cross and the altar for the mass had been put up by the Communist government itself for fear that, were church authorities left entirely in charge of the preparations, the people might later resist the dismantling of these symbols of Christianity.[53] The mass, conducted with great liturgical solemnity in Warsaw's Victory Square, was attended by a quarter of a million people and watched by hundreds of millions more on television throughout the world. How ironic that this square, which had been given its name after World War II by Communist rulers confident of success in shaping a new, "socialist," Poland, should, a third of a century later, be the scene of one of the greatest victories of the Polish church.

[47] Ibid., p. 151.

[48] Before the war, many priests, including bishops, openly supported the right-wing National Democrats. See Bender, loc. cit., p. 292.

[49] See Michnik, op. cit., and Lidia Ciolkosz, "The Uncensored Press," *Survey*, Autumn 1979, pp. 56–67.

[50] Radio Free Europe Research, *Situation Report* (Munich), No. 9, May 29, 1981, p. 43.

[51] Papal address to Poles, Oct. 23, 1978.

[52] *Dissent in Poland*, p. 150.

[53] This actually had occurred in Nowa Huta in April 1960. See Stehle, *The Independent Satellite*, p. 89.

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

Poles fill Warsaw's Victory Square to overflowing on June 2, 1979, as Pope John Paul II celebrates mass upon his visit to his homeland.

—EUPRA.

This triumph continued during the succeeding eight days of the papal pilgrimage to Poland's shrines and cities. Millions of people enthusiastically thronged to greet their pope and to participate in the liturgical celebrations. The air resounded with traditional Polish religious hymns and prayers.

Not all of those millions who gathered around the pope in those eventful days were religious believers. For those who were indifferent, agnostic, or atheist, his visit was an occasion to demonstrate their opposition to the totalitarian system as well as to show their allegiance to the West, long symbolized by Polish ties to Rome. Others were displaying their immense national pride in the fact that a Pole was the head of the Catholic Church.

For all, however, the true face of Poland and the bond uniting all of Polish society were suddenly revealed. As a novelist and former leading commentator on Polish radio was to write, "it suddenly became obvious that 'the emperor had no clothes.' "[54] The pontiff's visit left people with a marked sense of their own strength and their rulers' weakness. Added to this was a feeling of new things to come, of a renewal.[55] Bohdan Cywinski, a Catholic writer, noted perceptively: "The papal visit will be a time of sowing, the moral harvest will come later."[56] It was this prevailing mood which helped pave the way for the nonviolent victory of the workers one year later.

Solidarity and the Church

Until 1980, when Solidarity was formed, the church was the only organized force in Poland which cut across all social groups and confronted the government when the latter abused the civil rights of separate groups. Although the Committee for the Defense of the Workers consisted primarily of intellectuals who defended the workers from 1976 on, it was not certain until 1980 that the workers would risk arrests and persecution on

[54] Andrzej Szczypiorski, "The Limits of Political Realism," *Survey*, Autumn 1979, p. 29.

[55] For a good analysis of the impact of the Pope's visit, see Alexander Tomsky, "Poland's Church on the Road to Gdansk," *Religion in Communist Lands* (Keston, Kent), No. 1–2, 1981, pp. 28–39.

[56] *Survey*, Autumn 1979, p. 232.

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behalf of intellectuals, peasants, or other groups.

It is important to remember here that although the church had defended various dissenting groups before government authorities, its protests to the government had been couched in terms of civil and human rights in general rather than in terms of defense of a specific group. That is, the church, despite defending dissident groups, maintained its distance from them. Thus, up to 1980, the relationship between the church and the party-state structure could be characterized as bipolar. The church was the only institution that was independent of the regime, and as such, confronted the regime.

The strikes of 1980 and the emergence of the Solidarity movement as a legal third force transformed the role of the church from major adversary of the regime to a much-needed mediator between the regime and Solidarity. Initially, this new role created some misunderstandings. Basing himself on his own experience in dealing with the government, Wyszynski recommended a cautious step-by-step approach in a sermon delivered at the end of August 1980.[57] Quoted out of context by the regime's media, the sermon was interpreted as an appeal to end the strikes—to which the workers paid no heed. The Primate's position had to be explained in a letter issued by the episcopate on the next day. Any remaining misunderstandings were cleared up when Wyszynski met with Solidarity leader Lech Walesa shortly thereafter.

In the last months of Wyszynski's life, the church strongly supported Solidarity and the people's right to free assembly and freedom of expression. At the same time, the Primate and the bishops sought to influence the authorities, workers, and peasants in a patient effort to induce them to resolve their disputes and avoid a violent confrontation. In this period, Cardinal Wyszynski himself met several times with state and party leaders and was in constant touch with the leaders of Solidarity.[58] On some occasions, conflicts were avoided through mediation by the Primate or his representatives.

Wyszynski's successor as Primate, Archbishop Jozef Glemp, spelled out in a series of press interviews the position of the church in this entirely new situation. He said:

For the church, the emergence of Solidarity as a power which has moved to the forefront of society, came as a big surprise, but acceptance of Solidarity as a free trade union movement did not confront us with any problem. . . . The church is supporting Solidarity not as an ally but as defender of human rights in the spirit of the Gospel. . . . We do not want to dominate Solidarity, but we are ready to defend it if human rights are violated. . . . The church will counsel moderation and restraint in any conflict situation.[59]

[57] Radio Free Europe Research, *August 1980: The Strikes in Poland*, Munich, 1980, p. 133.

[58] Wyszynski met with Stanislaw Kania on Aug. 25 and Oct. 21, 1980, and Feb. 7, 1981; with Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, on Mar. 26, 1980. See *Tygodnik Powszechny*, June 7, 1981.

[59] Ibid., June 21, 1981.

At the left, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa meets with the new Polish Primate Jozef Glemp on July 22, 1981; at the right, Glemp mets with Polish Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski on July 11, 1981.

—Joseph Czarnecki/Gamma-Liaison and UPI.

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Polish Society and the Church

Pope John Paul II, when addressing Primate Wyszynski and his countrymen after his election, said:

There would be no Polish pope on Peter's throne without your faith which did not falter in the face of imprisonment and suffering, without your heroic hope. . . . There would be no Polish pope without the entire era in the history of our country so closely linked with your service as bishop and Primate.[60]

These words by the pontiff to the Polish Primate and pilgrims, if their full meaning is examined, go far to explain the strength and vitality of the church in Poland.

In the first place, Poland is a society which is nationally homogeneous and where over 90 percent of the population profess Catholicism. It is also a country where the official ideology never carried much appeal, and where Marxist revisionist philosophies, such as exemplified in the writings of Leszek Kolakowski and others before 1968, could not be translated into practice. Thus, the church has no vital ideological rival.

Amidst a prevalent religious indifference that the Catholic Church has faced worldwide since the 1960's, and especially so in urban and industrial areas, Poland stands out as a striking exception. The Polish church did not lose the allegiance of industrial workers. According to a sociological survey on religious attitudes, conducted in four new industrial centers (Pulawy, Kazimierz, Plock, and Nowa Huta), between 82.4 percent and 93.7 percent of the respondents identified themselves as believers. Moreover, between 10.6 percent (Nowa Huta) and 32.8 percent (Kazimierz) described themselves as "deeply religious." Between 16.5 and 19.4 percent of the believers were prepared to give their lives in defense of religion and the church—only slightly less than the number of people who would do so in defense of their country (21.9 percent to 24.1 percent).[61]

The deep religious feelings of the Polish working class were manifested also during the sit-in strikes of 1980. Religious emblems—the cross, pictures of the Madonna of Czestochowa and of John Paul II—were displayed everywhere alongside the Polish national flag. Sunday services celebrated in dockyards were attended by crowds of fervently praying strikers. One of the worker demands submitted to the authorities was that Sunday mass be broadcast on the state-controlled Polish radio.

As has been indicated earlier, Poland's liberal intellectuals, without necessarily becoming practicing Catholics, have to a large extent recognized the importance of the church as the repository and guardian of Polish spiritual and national values.

The personality and leadership of Cardinal Wyszynski, who set the example and largely determined the posture of the church in Poland, is also an important factor. The cardinal shared and expressed the aspirations of his people. Under his leadership, the church did not stand in conflict with the personal and national interests of the Polish people. At the same time, while being concerned about Polish national survival, the cardinal unremittingly defended moral values and preached that they must be practiced in everyday life.

In their eulogy to the dead cardinal, the leaders of Solidarity paid tribute to his example. They stated that he had initiated the Polish "renewal" long before 1980 and that Solidarity's achievements would not have been possible without his lonely struggle in earlier years. He always urged courage and fearlessness on his flock:

Have the courage to confess Christ and his church publicly—in school, at the university, at work, in the office. Do it without thinking of the consequences you might suffer. . . . If you believe deeply within the four walls of your home, do not lack the courage to confess Christ in public. We have not only the right but the moral and religious duty to defend the faith, our traditions, and our Polish culture.[62]

In 1963, he had declared: "If a citizen does not demand his rights, he is no longer a citizen: he becomes a slave."[63]

As Cardinal Wyszynski's successor, Archbishop Glemp is establishing his leadership under most difficult conditions. He, like Wyszynski in earlier years, is trying to preserve the church and shield his nation. After a certain initial hesitation, he is speaking out ever more strongly against the repressive martial-law regime. At the same time, he remains fully aware that the function of the church is to oppose violence and hatred. In a sermon criticizing the extraction of loyalty oaths from workers, Archbishop Glemp likened Poland's situation to the crucifixion of Christ. Yet, he went on to say:

[60] *The Washington Star*, Oct. 24, 1979.

[61] Wladyslaw Piwowarski, *Religijnosc Miejska w Rejonie Uprzemyslownosci* (Religious Attitudes in Industrial Urban Centers), Warsaw, Biblioteka "Wiezi," 1977. The results of Piwowarski's survey show a higher number of believers than do other public opinion polls. A group of sociologists of Warsaw University conducted public surveys on religious attitudes among students in 1958 and 1978. In 1958, 69 percent of the respondents were believers, including 9 percent who believed deeply, 26 percent who practiced regularly, and 29 percent who practiced irregularly. In 1978, believers constituted 64 percent, including 10 percent who believed deeply, 21 percent who practiced regularly, and 31 percent who practiced irregularly. See Stefan Nowak, loc. cit.

[62] Quoted in *Kultura* (Paris), No. 6, 1978, p. 88.

[63] *The New York Times*, May 29, 1981.

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Christ hanging on the cross forgave all his oppressors, all the villains who flogged and crucified Him. This is our Christian way, our difficult way. . . .[64]

Later, in another sermon, he stated:

If we want cooperation in our country, we need dialogue. It is not enough to threaten people, to fire them from jobs, it is necessary to talk to people. . . .[65]

As these comments indicate, certain responses by the church are inevitable in view of its spiritual mission. However, the position which the church will adopt vis-à-vis the regime will be largely influenced by the actions of the regime itself. The worst possible alternative which can be foreseen is that the present Polish military rulers, acting under Soviet pressure, will move beyond the liquidation of the worker and peasant Solidarity movement and of the democratic movement of the intellectuals. In any attempt to bring Poland back to a more orthodox model, the church would inevitably become the next target of the regime. Such a course would have to involve considerable escalation of repressive measures, and force the church to refight battles it had previously won.

There is also the possibility that continuing nonviolent resistance, compounded by economic pressures, may lead to a situation where, with Moscow's concurrence, the military government in Warsaw pursues a more conciliatory policy. Under these circumstances, the regime may seek a dialogue with the church as the only remaining spokesman of society. There is little doubt that, should the regime seek a policy of cooperation—or even of accommodation—the church would offer to act as a mediator in the search for an acceptable compromise.

[64] Ibid., Jan. 11, 1982.

[65] *The Washington Post*, Jan. 18, 1982.

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Kto Kogo in the Kremlin*

by William G. Hyland

One of the casualties of the prolongation of the Brezhnev era has been a decline in the art of Kremlinology. Faced with what seemed to be a fairly stable Soviet leadership, students of the Soviet scene have gradually strayed off into the more alluring fields of behavioral sciences, generational change, nationality problems, military doctrine, etc. The game of Kremlin politics has increasingly been ignored.

Yet the deaths of two major Soviet leaders—Aleksey Kosygin in December 1980 and Mikhail Suslov in January 1982—are sharp reminders not only that personalities are important elements of Soviet politics but that the constellation of political power is an increasingly fragile one. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a Soviet leadership without Suslov, who seemed a permanent fixture bridging the Stalin period and the present. His presence somehow conferred a legitimacy on both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. The succession to Brezhnev has to be quite a different process without the participation of Kosygin and Suslov. Who replaces Suslov—not merely in name or title, but who performs the function of guardian of orthodoxy, who becomes the senior arbiter of high-level disputes? How will domestic policy be affected? Has Brezhnev become suddenly more vulnerable?

Speculation about political personalities in the Soviet system is difficult and too often fruitless, and speculation about the relationship between personalities and policy questions is even more hazardous. But Western governments simply want to know: (1) who will rule the USSR in the 1980's, and (2) what will Soviet policy be?

These questions are not as shallow as they may sound. Sovietologists surely know that there is a revisionist school of history which views the course of East-West relations as a record of missed opportunities. While revisionist theories are always greeted with skepticism, it is nevertheless true that there have been turning points when one side or the other has made a crucial decision based on a guess about the other's intentions (e.g., NCS–68).[1] Sovietologists would do well to bear this fact in mind.

What follows is a deliberately semi-provocative review of some of the issues which need to be addressed in this context. Let us begin with the question of the Soviet leadership.

The Men in the Kremlin

The Marxists are wrong. Individuals and their personalities do matter. They do shape history. And they certainly have shaped Soviet history.

It is unfortunate that Western Sovietology has come under the sway of a school of analysis that has subconsciously accepted some key premises of Marxist determinism. These analysts argue that only the system counts. It has a massive momentum and its own laws, institutions, and dynamics. Since Stalin's death, leaders come and go; it does not matter who is on top. Soviet policy will turn out to be about the same.

This is nonsense. Leonid Brezhnev is not Nikita Khrushchev, nor was Khrushchev Iosif Stalin. It is inconceivable, for example, that Brezhnev could carry out the

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*"*Kto kogo?*" is colloquial Russian for "Who wins? Who loses?"—Eds.

[1] NSC–68 was a document delineating a US policy response to the perceived Soviet threat in 1950 in light of the USSR's new nuclear capabilities and its presumed intentions. See, for example, Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Sounding the Tocsin: NCS 68 and the Soviet Threat," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1979, pp. 116–58.

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ruthless bloody purges of the 1930's, even if he had the power and opportunity. Or, to look at things from a different standpoint, let us suppose that Khrushchev had thwarted the coup of October 1964 and had remained in office until his death. How would he have handled the Vietnam war, the Czechoslovak crisis, or *Ostpolitik?* The same as Brezhnev? Would Khrushchev have invaded Czechoslovakia on the eve of a summit meeting with President Lyndon Johnson? Suppose Brezhnev had not survived when he was ill in 1975. Would Andrey Kirilenko have prevailed? Would Cuban troops now be in Angola or Ethiopia? Would there be a strategic arms limitation treaty?

True, analysis of personalities from afar is a dubious art. It inevitably lapses into an analysis of career patterns. Thus, so and so is a "survivor," because he has, in fact, survived. The "formative experience" of so and so was his rapid rise during the purges, or during Stalin's last days, or under Khrushchev, or even under Brezhnev. This is useful but limited, and for a policymaker it is normally frustrating.

Every recent American president has asked, "What is Brezhnev really like?" Before the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit in 1972, a large package of papers was prepared, drawing on mountains of public sources. But probably the most valuable briefing paper was that by Henry Kissinger, who had seen Brezhnev at close quarters for several days just a month before. Since then, a growing number of officials have dealt with Brezhnev, and he is no longer such a mystery. But what about the other Soviet leaders?

There is the rub. The Soviet system conspires to shield a large number of officials from non-Communist observers. How many diplomats or other observers have had much contact with, let us say, Viktor Grishin, who could conceivably become the next General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)? Or, if you prefer, Kirilenko or Konstantin Chernenko? Yet, some day President Reagan or his successor is certain to ask the same question: What is X really like?

All of this is to suggest that the succession needs to be analyzed and discussed in terms of leading personali-

A poster featuring Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev on display in Moscow's Red Square for the occasion of Revolution Day, November 7, 1981.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

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ties, rather than sociological groups or institutions. It is important to distinguish between a Grishin and, say, a Yuriy Andropov. It must take a peculiar personality to preside over the grisly work of the Committee for State Security, the KGB. Picture a man who moves from the Central Committee apparatus to the Foreign Ministry, ultimately receiving an ambassadorial assignment (Hungary, 1954–57); subsequently returns to the Central Committee; and then, suddenly, at age 52, becomes the Chairman of the KGB. On the one hand, the Politburo members must have regarded him as sufficiently manageable to pose no threat to the collective; on the other hand, they must have deemed him to be sufficiently ruthless to perform the dreaded work of the KGB. Surely, if Andropov were to become General Secretary of the CPSU, he would be a different leader from Grishin, who has spent his entire career in the environs of Moscow on economic and party assignments.

Beyond the idiosyncrasies of this or that individual, there is the question of interaction. No guarantee exists that several men thrown together by politics will automatically be supportive. Nevertheless, over time cliques do form, and friendships as well. Moreover, even in more calculating relationships there is a certain supportiveness in common decisions. For instance, one finds it plausible that when Brezhnev, Aleksey Kosygin, and Nikolay Podgornyy—once the heads of party, government, and state—were in agreement, this was a powerful bloc, and few would have dared to challenge it.

It thus may be of some interest that in recent years Brezhnev has stood more and more alone, surrounded more by cronies than by equals. Only a few Politburo members who were active at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 are still on Brezhnev's Politburo.[2] One can only wonder how this state of affairs has affected his decisions, let us say, in the Afghanistan and Polish crises.

Power Politics

In any case, Brezhnev does now stand apart from most of his colleagues. Indeed, the story of Soviet politics over the last five years is largely a narrative of Brezhnev's accumulation of ever greater power.

He began in 1977 by focusing on two institutions, the Secretariat of the CPSU's Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The first step was the removal of K. F. Katushev from the Secretariat in March 1977 and his eventual replacement by one of Brezhnev's close personal aides, Konstantin Rusakov. It really does not matter why this shift was made; the net result is that Brezhnev placed a close protégé in an important position in the central party apparatus, to work with foreign Communist parties (and thus constitute a potential replacement for Boris Ponomarëv as head of the International Department). Of related interest was the promotion of Vasiliy Kuznetsov to First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium, thus weakening somewhat the Foreign Ministry apparatus. Kuznetsov's replacement as First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs was Georgiy Korniyenko, a man of undoubted ability, but without the prestige of Kuznetsov. Another of Brezhnev's close personal protégés, Ye. M. Tyazhel'nikov, left the post of head of the Komsomol to take over the Central Committee's Propaganda Department. Most important, of course, Brezhnev forced out his longtime comrade Podgornyy from the chairmanship of the Presidium and himself assumed the post of head of state. At first, it seemed somewhat surprising that he would want this largely ceremonial office, but, on reflection, it made sense. Why not take the ceremonial office, so as to represent the Soviet state as well as the party? To strengthen Brezhnev's hold on foreign policy, the Foreign Ministry press spokesman, Leonid Zamyatin, was transferred to head a newly created Central Committee Department of International Information. Gradually, this department has begun to overshadow the conventional Foreign Ministry apparatus. Finally, Brezhnev's hold on the party apparatus was further enhanced by the promotion to candidate membership in the Politburo of Chernenko, one of his oldest cronies.

The next major target was the governmental apparatus, the USSR Council of Ministers and Prime Minister Kosygin himself. In November-December 1978, Konstantin Mazurov was removed from the Politburo and as First Deputy Prime Minister, although he had served for more than a decade in the latter position. Obviously, in light of Kosygin's health and age, the post of First Deputy Prime Minister was a crucial one, so the installation of Nikolay Tikhonov, Brezhnev's old friend,[3] in this job and his promotion to candidate membership in the Politburo was another sign of the times. The implications of the promotion were further underlined by the fact that Chernenko at the same time attained full membership in the Politburo, after only 19 months as a candidate. Soon Kosygin became ill. Although he reappeared for a while, his retirement was announced in the fall of 1980,[4] and his replacement was, of course,

[2] Of the 13 full members of the Politburo in February 1982, only Brezhnev, Kirilenko, and A. Pel'she held this position in 1968.

[3] N. Tikhonov, who is a year and a half older than Brezhnev, has known the General Secretary since their student days in the 1920's.

[4] Kosygin died in December 1980.

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Soviet leaders after laying a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier near the Kremlin Wall on May 9, 1980, the 35th anniversary of the Soviet victory in World War II. In the front row, from left to right, are: N. A. Tikhonov, K. U. Chernenko, A. A. Gromyko, M. A. Suslov (since deceased), L. I. Brezhnev, A. N. Kosygin (since deceased), A. P. Kirilenko, and V. V. Grishin. At the right, saluting, is Marshal N. Ogarkov.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

Tikhonov, who also became a full Politburo member. Tikhonov's new first deputy is still another Brezhnev protégé from Dnepropetrovsk, Ivan Arkhipov. In December 1980, Ivan Bodyul, an old associate of Brezhnev from the 1950's in Moldavia, was appointed a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.

In the space of three years, then, the Brezhnevites have greatly strengthened their hold on the Secretariat, the Politburo, and the government, including the KGB. The importance of this fact lies not in Brezhnev's decision to take such a step. His decision is quite understandable if one bears in mind that Soviet politics remains fundamentally a struggle for power. Why should Brezhnev not surround himself with old and trusted friends, protégés, and cronies? Given what happened to Khrushchev, it is simple prudence.

Rather, the significance of these developments stems from the degree to which it increases the probability that once Brezhnev disappears, the upheaval at the top will be severe. After all, why would Brezhnev's successors want to remain dependent on the coterie of his old political friends, even if these successors do share a common background with them, from the old days in Dnepropetrovsk or Moldavia?

The result of these shifts, therefore, has been a sort of political paralysis. At the 26th CPSU Congress, for example, no change whatsoever was made in leading personnel. Probably no one other than Brezhnev was prepared to propose even a minor shift in the correlation of political forces lest the entire situation come apart. Replacement of any leader because of age would open some sensitive political questions.

In such circumstances, the outlook is for a struggle for power among Brezhnev's epigones. Although the Brezhnevites have a lock on certain key positions, their hold has to be only tentative, for it is derivative of Brezhnev's power. By promoting protégés who have no special base of their own, except perhaps for Chernenko,[5] Brezhnev has deprived them of the chance to survive the bloody politics of the succession. Meanwhile, it is worth keeping in mind, as Myron Rush has wisely pointed out,[6] that Brezhnev remains a dominant figure, still capable of rearranging the Soviet power

[5] Chernenko might have some base in the Central Committee apparatus, where he served for many years.

[6] Myron Rush, "Understanding Brezhnev's Political Strength," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Aug. 20, 1981.

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structure and even of engaging in some daring forays abroad at a time of supposed political stagnation.

Power and Policy

This brings us to the most important issues. What are the foreign and defense policies of the USSR likely to be (keeping in mind that there will be a struggle for Brezhnev's mantle)?

It is tempting to draw on previous succession periods—1953–57 and 1964–66—as analogues. In both periods, there was a tendency toward relieving foreign pressures by conciliatory policies while the internal power situation was sorted out.

But two things are lacking now that were present then. First, the successors in the 1950's and 1960's were younger. Second, in both cases, the successors were initially intent on some internal change—halting the Stalinist terror after 1953 and rebuilding a divided party after 1964.

One can envisage a post-Brezhnev Politburo of more sharply differing factions: the Brezhnevites, deeply entrenched but without the ultimate power of the patron, will undoubtedly want to preserve the status quo; some of the old guard—such as Andrey Gromyko or Dmitriy Ustinov—could still be powerful and prestigious figures to be reckoned with; and a somewhat amorphous group of younger men in the Secretariat and on the Politburo may be building pressure against the old guard. It will be tempting to inject into this situation the professional military and the KGB as decisive factors. Indeed, their influence in partisan politics could be significant, as perhaps it may have been in the past when towering heroes such as Marshal Georgiy Zhukov were engaged in politics.

But some skepticism is in order on this score. Nikolay Ogarkov, the present Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, does not strike one as much of a political actor, and certainly neither does Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the head of the Warsaw Pact forces. The KGB under Andropov, of course, is a different matter, because of his political status and because the KGB has technical capabilities—security, and leadership transportation and communication. Nevertheless, the possibility of a threat of force by the KGB seems remote. Furthermore, some of the old antagonism between the professional officer corps and the KGB must still exist.

To be sure, the military certainly will not gracefully accept a cut in its forces or resources, and the KGB presumably will resist any liberalization of the internal order. Thus, they are both likely to be strong forces favoring the status quo. At the same time, they will in all probability also be political targets. A new General Secretary will eventually want control over the KGB and the General Staff. Brezhnev's record in this regard is a case in point.

Important regional party leaders: left, G. V. Romanov, First Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee and member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); right, V. V. Shcherbitskiy, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and CPSU Politburo member.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

Despite a strong inclination toward conservative policies, the new leaders will be under pressure to innovate. It is the consensus among outside observers that the objective situation requires new directions, especially in internal economic policy.[7]

But crucial questions remain. Who, precisely, will be in the vanguard of those arguing for new directions? Certainly not the older men who have comfortably settled in for the duration. Nor the General Staff, nor the KGB. Probably not the Central Committee apparatus. Who, then? Perhaps the provincial secretaries, in Leningrad, Kiev, and elsewhere. Or it is possible that earlier patterns will be repeated. That is, one major figure may fight for power on one platform—almost certainly a conservative one—but after eliminating his rivals and securing his position, he may then adopt a different, more effective and realistic program. Again, such speculation cries out for names and faces.

One reason why names and faces are important is that few in the Soviet Union are qualified to take over the conduct of foreign policy. The bulk of the Soviet leadership concern themselves with internal policies. Even though Brezhnev had served as chief of state before the anti-Khrushchev coup, he had not been involved in the operation of Soviet global policy. That was

[7] Seweryn Bialer, "The Harsh Decade: Soviet Policies in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), Summer 1981, pp. 999 ff.

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largely Kosygin's preserve, on which Brezhnev encroached only gradually. But since taking over the reins of Soviet foreign policy in the early 1970's, Brezhnev has dominated it—so much so that no one else has had much experience. Except for Gromyko, only those in the Secretariat of the Central Committee who deal with foreign Communists have much background in foreign affairs. In this context, the emergence of Zamyatin's new department is of some significance.

If Gromyko survives, then, he will be the major voice in mundane foreign affairs, but the strategic line will still have to be set by the General Secretary. Recall the struggles in 1953–57 between Khrushchev, the neophyte, and Vyacheslav Molotov, the old professional.[8]

For Western observers there are two areas of greatest concern: (1) whether the buildup in Soviet military forces will continue, and (2) whether Soviet foreign policy will have an aggressive character, or begin to moderate.

Defense Policies

It is likely that several members of the present Politburo aside from Brezhnev have been involved in defense policy: obviously Ustinov, as Defense Minister; Gromyko, because of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; probably Kirilenko, because he is the "second" Secretary; Chernenko, who has some responsibilities in the defense field; probably some in the Secretariat who are involved with defense industries; and the head of the KGB. Moreover, in contrast to foreign policy, defense policy—because of its widespread repercussions in the economy—must be generally familiar to all in the Politburo (not in terms of a knowledge of esoteric weapons, but in terms of the number of workers, the amount of steel, etc., required).

By background and by inclination, Brezhnev is pro-military. Indeed, no one would argue that he has not been more than kind to the defense establishment. But, except for Ustinov, the others have no such long background or emotional attachment. Thus, it is very unlikely that a new leader would have the wherewithal to challenge the military immediately.

But can this situation last? If the military proves to be untouchable and keeps its share of the national economy, and if the economy slows down as much as Western observers predict,[9] then the military share of the national product will grow absolutely and relatively and become a tempting target for reductions. All of this probably means that after the first phase of the struggle in which the successor enlists the tacit support of the military, he will eventually turn on his supporters, if he wants to pursue a successful economic policy.

It may be somewhat easier for Brezhnev's successor to confront the military problem because, strangely enough, Brezhnev seems to be laying the groundwork to reduce the military's claims to priority in national policy. He has done so by assaulting one of its sacred preserves: military doctrine. For years, the Soviet military were permitted to write that nuclear war was winnable. They did not do so in crude terms, but this was certainly the import of their writings. Just when it seemed to Westerners that they had a firm fix on Soviet military doctrine and policy, however, Brezhnev has confused the issue. To appreciate what has happened, one needs to trace his statements over time.

In the early 1970's, with the advent of parity, Brezhnev declared: "We have created strategic forces which constitute a reliable means of deterring aggressors." Nevertheless, a reliable Soviet deterrent was still considered precarious and subject to Western attempts to regain strategic superiority. Thus, Brezhnev repeatedly warned that the USSR would "respond to any and all attempts from any quarter to obtain military superiority over the USSR. . . ."[10]

By 1975, however, Brezhnev had concluded that the new strategic balance was firmly enough entrenched so that a return to Western strategic dominance was increasingly unlikely and hence the West had accepted détente. As he put things:

International détente has become possible because a new relation of forces has been established in the world arena. Now the leaders of the bourgeois world can no longer entertain serious intentions of resolving the historic dispute between socialism and capitalism, by force of arms. . . .[11]

Less than two years later, the General Secretary deemed that the increase in all levels of Soviet forces had reached a point where it was no longer effective politics (or policy) to trumpet this new balance of power, for it was creating a backlash in the West, where Soviet statements about "superiority" or "victory" were cited in support of Western rearmament.[12] In January 1977, he

[8] Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR*, London, Macmillan, 1962, pp. 263 ff.

[9] Bialer, loc. cit., pp. 1004–05.

[10] Quoted in Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, Summer 1978, p. 137.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary* (New York, NY), July 1977, p. 21.

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Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor G. Kulikov, center, Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Treaty forces, pictured at joint maneuvers in East Germany in 1980. —Christian Vioujard/Gamma-Liaison.

began to insist that the USSR did not seek strategic superiority and to rebut the allegation that the USSR was intent on a first strike, which he dismissed as "absurd and utterly unfounded."[13] These denials, of course, were intended to counter American apprehensions that the new Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) would eventually achieve a capability of neutralizing the US Minuteman ICBM force. By the end of 1977, Brezhnev had gone even further and was insisting that the USSR "*will not* seek military superiority over the other side. We do not want to upset the approximate equilibrium of military strength existing at present . . . between the USSR and the United States."[14]

This new line was echoed rather consistently until, in 1981, Brezhnev took another step. He denounced aspirations for victory in nuclear war as "dangerous madness."[15]

It may be significant that one of the more vigorous assaults on nuclear confrontation was carried out by Chernenko in April 1981 at the Lenin birthday celebration. He introduced the Malenkov heresy—that nuclear war posed a threat to "all civilization." Later in the same speech, he said that nuclear weapons placed the "future of mankind in doubt."[16] Chernenko has a unique record in this area. On several occasions, he has seemed to be well ahead of others in warnings about the consequences of nuclear war: for example, when he stated in November 1976 that "mankind might be totally destroyed."[17] Since he was promoted during this very period, we have to assume his attack was endorsed, if not encouraged, by Brezhnev. Indeed, as noted, Brezhnev finally entered the arena with more graphic language—"madness"—and a Central Committee pamphlet repeated the Malenkov deviation.[18]

All of this occurred at a time when the military itself

[13] Quoted in Garthoff, loc. cit., pp. 139–40.
[14] Ibid., p. 141. Emphasis added.
[15] Dusko Doder, "Nuclear Flap," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 23, 1981, p. A26.
[16] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Trends in Communist Media* (Washington, DC), May 6, 1981, pp. 6–9.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, *The Soviet Threat to Europe*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1981.

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

Changing of the honor guard (a KGB unit) at the Lenin Mausoleum outside the Kremlin Wall in Moscow.
—J. Vautier/FPG.

was engaging in a spirited and rather amazing defense of itself, primarily through a July 1981 *Kommunist* article by Marshal Ogarkov.[19] In this article, Ogarkov vigorously defended the legitimacy of Soviet military doctrine, duly cited Brezhnev on the doctrine's "defensive" character, and repeated Brezhnev's formulation that the use of nuclear weapons would mean that the "future of all mankind would be at stake." But this obeisance was minor compared to some of Ogarkov's startling claims.

First, the Chief of Staff bemoaned the fact that Soviet youth did not understand that some wars are "good" and some are "bad," and he maintained that they needed to be educated by the party. In this connection, he urged the party to explain to all of the people "in a more profound and better reasoned form the truth about the existing threat of the danger of war. It should not be overdramatized, but it is obligatory to show the seriousness of the contemporary international situation." Such remarks seem to be a rather blatant pitch to protect his budget.

But perhaps more important than this special pleading (which suggested that he still feared that economic stringencies would impinge on defense's share of the country's resources), Ogarkov laid out a claim to even more resources. In modern operations, he argued, the "system of rear and technical support should acquire new content." Particular importance, he wrote, should be attached to the country's rear services, which "must make good in a shorter space of time the loss of high quantities of combat hardware and weapons, without which it is virtually impossible to maintain the armed forces' combat capability at the necessary level." This statement cannot be read except as a demand that the economy supply not only operational equipment but more for stockpiles as well. Indeed, he also reminded his readers that modern weapons change "every 10–12 years." In other words, cuts in defense in later years would also be dangerous.

This military claim is even more significant when we consider that for most of 1979 and 1980, Brezhnev was warning the heavy industry clique that they had to make a greater contribution to consumer goods production, and that defense industries in particular had to help out.[20] Hence, Ogarkov may have been answering Brezhnev.

In any case, the stage is set for a struggle over defense policy after Brezhnev. It could not really be otherwise if we consider that defense claims 12–15 percent of the Soviet national economic product.[21]

While there is an idea in the West that the Soviet military buildup is sacrosanct, it of course is not. What matters is how it fits into the internal struggle. Khrushchev called in Zhukov to defeat Georgiy Malenkov and Molotov (who incidentally had reputations as Stalinists but actually favored some soft policies).[22] But Khrushchev then threw out Zhukov and conducted a long attack on the military, even though he also laid the groundwork for much of the strategic buildup carried out by Brezhnev. So nothing is preordained in Soviet politics.

Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is also in flux. Throughout the past two years, Soviet policy has been trying to come to grips with the shifts in the West: the uproar over Afghanistan and the sanctions against the USSR imposed by the Carter administration, the collapse of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the election of President Ronald

[19] N. Ogarkov, "Defending Peaceful Endeavor," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, July 1981, pp. 80–91.

[20] Speeches to Central Committee plenum, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Oct. 22, 1980, p. R/1, and Nov. 29, 1979, p. R/1.

[21] Abraham S. Becker, *The Burden of Soviet Defense*, Report 2752-AF, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, October 1981.

[22] Conquest, op. cit., pp. 329 ff.

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

The Kremlin office of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

Reagan, followed by plans for major increases in American defense spending.

All of these developments, of course, could be laid at Brezhnev's door. His defense has been interesting. At the Central Committee plenum in June 1980, he took the position that the USSR had to act with restraint and should not let itself be provoked by the West. He became almost nostalgic about the 1970's: "We should continue to spare no effort to preserve détente, *all the good things* that the seventies brought us. . . ."[23] Moreover, the plenum formally registered approval of Brezhnev's performance. According to the plenum resolution, the 1970's had seen an improvement in the international situation, and there was an "obvious decline in the cold war." The CPSU, the plenum document went on, was displaying "a truly Leninist restraint." In essence, thus, the resolution was a holding operation. It called for strengthening defense, on the one hand, and for mobilizing forces to prevent a "sliding down to a new cold war," on the other.[24]

By the time of the 26th Congress of the CPSU in February 1981, however, hopes that the cold war was not returning were fading. Before the congress, for example, Ustinov maintained that the threat of war had increased; Ogarkov claimed that the forces of imperialism were striving to wreck the process of relaxation and that therefore there were increased demands on "combat readiness."[25]

Nonetheless, there was still an inclination to try to retrieve the situation. Dinmukhamed Kunayev contended that the USSR had to show firmness and not permit the "torpedoing of détente."[26] Vladimir Shcherbitskiy warned against permitting events to turn the world back to the "worst times of the cold war."[27] Grishin called for "preserving détente."[28] Even Ustinov said that the Soviet Union had enough self-control not to yield to provocations.[29] At the congress, Grigoriy Romanov expressed the same theme: that despite the severe test, the USSR was not being "driven from the course of normalization" of the situation.[30]

But after the congress the tone of comments became more ominous. Although *Pravda* claimed that the struggle for peace was the leitmotif of the congress, it then went on to mention strengthening defense three times.[31] *Izvestiya* held that implementation of the congress plans "depends directly on the country's defense might."[32] In April, Chernenko warned that the "war danger, which somewhat diminished in the middle of the last decade, has increased again."[33]

The situation, however, remains rather confused. At the Central Committee plenum finally called in late 1981 to adopt the five-year plan announced in February, Brezhnev claimed: "In working out the plans we naturally also had to take into account the worsening of the international situation." And in going over the main features of the plan, he noted that "reliable" provision was being made for the needs of defense.[34] In present-

[23] *FBIS-SOV*, June 24, 1980, p. R/1. Emphasis added.

[24] Ibid., pp. R/4–6.

[25] Ustinov, as translated in *ibid.*, Dec. 11, 1980, p. V/1; Ogarkov, in ibid., Jan. 16, 1981, p. V/1.

[26] Report to the 15th Kazakh Communist Party Congress, ibid., Feb. 18, 1981, p. R/3.

[27] Report at the 26th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress on Feb. 10, 1981, ibid., Feb. 25, 1981, p. R/1.

[28] "Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress, Vol. III," translated in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 26, 1981, Supplement, p. 44.

[29] *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 23, 1981, p. V/5.

[30] "Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress, Vol. IV," *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 27, 1981, Supplement, p. 38.

[31] *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 11, 1981, p. P/1.

[32] Ibid., Mar. 12, 1981, p. P/1.

[33] Ibid., Apr. 23, 1981, p. R/1.

[34] *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 17, 1981; *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 17, 1981, p. R/1.

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ing the 1982 budget, moreover, Minister of Finance Vasiliy Garbuzov said that while struggling for peace, "our party and state evaluate soberly the international situation."[35] Thus, Brezhnev seems to have positioned the party to move either toward conciliation, thus justifying "Leninist restraint," or toward confrontation. The ultimate decision may well be made by his successors.

Kto Kogo?

In conclusion, let me reiterate a basic theme. An eminent Sovietologist, Jerry F. Hough, has written:

. . . even if Westerners knew who the next general secretary would be, the information would be of little use. There is almost no Politburo figure of the Brezhnev period whose position in the Soviet political spectrum has been agreed upon by Western specialists. . . .

The most useful contribution that can be made beforehand to an understanding of the succession is to analyze the problems and the most likely possible variants—both "healthy" and "pathological."[36]

Such an approach, in my opinion, concedes the field too easily. A diligent effort, which Hough himself has often demonstrated, should yield a great deal more about Soviet power politics.

But it is not simply a question of analyzing changing generations. Rather, it is a question of determining the principal actcrs and where they stand on major policy issues. While it is true that the previous track record of Kremlinologists is not enviable, the main rules continue to be valid. Soviet politics, at bottom, is a struggle for power. And there is absolutely no basis to believe that it will not continue to be so. What we have to do is to identify the players and their policies.

[35] *FBIS-SOV,* Nov. 17, 1981, pp. R/16–17.

[36] Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Leadership in Transition,* Washington DC, The Brookings Institution, 1980, p. 151.

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Between the Lines of the 1979 Soviet Census

by Murray Feshbach

Demographic trends in the USSR are of major importance, bearing on all aspects of Soviet society both today and in the future. These developments affect the labor force, the military, the formation of households, and the size of ethnic groups of the Soviet multinational state. They also shape demand for housing, for educational facilities, and for food and proper nutrition, as well as for capital investment to meet these needs.

Recognizing the importance of demographic matters, the Soviet Union has conducted three censuses in the postwar period—in 1959, 1970, and, most recently, January 1979. After the first two, the Soviet government published a wide range of basic demographic data on the characteristics of the population. A total of 16 volumes containing the results of the 1959 census appeared, one each for the USSR and its 15 union republics.[1] Each of these volumes was divided by subject, covering the size, location, age, sex, marital status, education, social class, economic activity, occupation, nationality, native tongue of the populace, plus information on families—a normal pattern of topics for such endeavors (although it is clear that much more was collected than was actually released). Seven volumes were published on the results of the 1970 census. Each volume dealt with a subject area and had data not only for the USSR but also for each of the 15 republics. Volume 1, appearing in 1972, covered the size of the population and its location (urban/rural). Volume 2, on distribution by sex, age, and marital status, and Volume 3, on education, also appeared in 1972, i.e., within three years of the census date. The remaining four volumes—on nationality, on employment, on occupation, and a combined volume on migration and family composition—came out in the following two years.[2]

Judging from this track record, one would have expected a comparable publishing program following the latest Soviet census. So far, however, this has not been the case. Today, three years after the census, not a single volume has been published, nor does the new, combined Publishing House of Finance and Statistics (Izdatel'stvo finansy i statistiki) list a single census volume in its publishing plan for 1982.[3] Rumor variously has it that only two volumes will appear, that no volumes will be published until all the data have been analyzed, or that there may be none at all.

In the absence of such publications, the Central Statistical Administration (TsSU) has released some general census results in its *Vestnik statistiki* (Statistical Herald) and in the general news media.[4] This material relates to nationality, native tongue, education, training,

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[1] See USSR Central Statistical Administration (hereafter TsSU), *Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda: SSSR (svodnyy tom)* (Results of the 1959 All-Union Census: USSR [Summary Volume]), Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1962; and the 15 republic volumes, under the same authorship and title (except for designation of the name of the republic), Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1962–63.

[2] TsSU, *Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census—hereafter, *Itogi 1970*), Vols. 1–7, Moscow, Statistika, 1972–74.

[3] Gosudarstvennyy komitet SSSR po delam izdatel'stv, poligrafii i knizhnoy torgovli, *"Finansy i statistika"—annotirovannyy tematicheskiy plan vypuska literatury izdatel'stva na 1982 god* ("Finance and Statistics"—Annotated Plan for Publication of Literature of the Publishing House for 1982), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1981.

[4] *Vestnik statistiki* (Moscow), Nos. 2, 6–12, 1980, and Nos. 1–2, 4–5, and 11–12, 1981; issues of the central press for Apr. 22, 1979; and TsSU, *Naseleniye USSR po dannym Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1979 goda* (Population of the USSR—from Data of the 1979 All-Union Census), Moscow, Politizdat, 1980—a brochure drawn exclusively from data previously published in *Vestnik statistiki.*

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Computers of the USSR Statistical Administration being prepared in January 1979 to receive data from the All-Union Census.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

marital status, and employment. Singularly absent has been data relating to age structure.

The net result is a very incomplete picture of the census results. However, the underlying demographic realities remain important. Hence, it is worth the effort to examine the highlights of the information released to date, venture some inferential judgments to fill gaps in what has been released, and point to some selected implications of these data for future Soviet population growth, or lack of it.

Demographic Problems

The principal conclusion emerging from a review of the 1979 census results available and from estimates made on the basis of the published data is that important changes are occurring in the structure of the Soviet population today relating to its internal distribution and age structure. These fall into four general, interrelated categories: (1) differential rates of population growth among different national groups; (2) failure of the male population of the USSR—particularly in predominantly Slavic areas—to regain its demographically normal share of total population in the postwar period; (3) uneven geographic distribution of the youngest population cohorts (those aged 0 to 9 years); and (4) an "aging" of the overall population.

These demographic developments have enormous implications for the future size, structure, and distribution of total population and of individual ethnic groups. They must be taken into account not only by Soviet authorities but also by decision-makers of other countries whose future security depends upon an accurate assessment of the nature and strength of Soviet society. While Moscow clearly has considerable information on these trends and Soviet specialists have even used the term "deformation" (*deformatsiya*) to describe one

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aspect of them,[5] none of the critical census data have yet been published.

Despite such limitations on the available evidence, one can reconstruct some picture of these significant demographic trends. The emphasis here is on presentation of the data rather than a detailed discussion of the underlying issues or policy responses. Nonetheless, some comments will perforce be included.

1. Differential trends among nationalities. The 1979 census confirmed an extremely low rate of growth of Slavic nationalities and of the general population in the predominantly Slavic republics, which must be of major concern to the Russians in the Kremlin. From published data, we can determine that the rate of growth of the Great Russian population was only 0.70 percent a year during the 1970–79 intercensal period. This rate was below the figure for the USSR as a whole (0.90 percent per annum), above the rates for the other two Slavic ethnic groups (0.50 for the Belorussians and 0.43 for the Ukrainians), but less than one third the rate of growth of the population of Muslim origin (2.47 percent). Individual Muslim ethnic groups grew at markedly faster rates: the Uzbeks at 3.43 percent and the Tadzhiks at 3.45 percent. All of these rates reflect a slowdown from the rates of growth in the 1959–70 intercensal period. In the earlier period, the growth of the USSR population was 1.34 percent a year; that of the Great Russians, 1.12 percent; that of the Belorussians, 1.23 percent; that of the Ukrainians, 0.82 percent; that of the Muslims as a whole, 3.25 percent; that of the Uzbeks, 3.93 percent; and that of the Tadzhiks, 3.94 percent.[6]

Obviously, rates of growth of the various ethnic groups reflect the net impact of natural increase (the excess of live births over deaths), processes of assimilation, and any migration into or out of the Soviet Union. In explaining differential growth rates in the case of the nationalities in the USSR, the last two factors are of relatively minor quantitative importance, except perhaps for Ukrainians and Belorussians calling themselves Russians for census purposes and the unclear situation regarding the number of Jews in the USSR.

Net emigration from the Soviet Union over the whole postwar period (mostly in the last decade) probably amounts to somewhat less than 400,000, or only a very small 0.15 percent of the 262 million citizens counted in 1979. These included perhaps 250,000 Jews, 80,000–90,000 Germans, 10,000 Armenians, and the rest scattered in lesser quantities among the other nationalities.[7] Emigration clearly is of importance to the several nationalities mentioned, but it has had little impact on Slavic or Muslim population trends.

A woman and her children pictured in Dushanbe, capital of Tadzhikistan.

—Mary Ann Brockman/Photo Researchers.

Likewise, assimilation might be assumed—if it had any impact—to have narrowed the spread between Slavic and Muslim population growth statistics. Simply put, there is little evidence of persons of Slavic origins adopting Muslim nationalities, and whatever success the Great Russians have had in assimilating persons of Muslim origin has served only to moderate the growth of Muslim nationalities.

Thus, we must look elsewhere for our explanations of the differential slowing of growth rates of different ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. The most likely factors are differential trends in fertility and mortality.

Soviet official sources have provided some information on fertility over the years, but it has generally been highly aggregated and reported only by republic. Hence, it has been less than fully enlightening with regard to differences among nationalities of the USSR. Western observers were thus hopeful of gaining new

[5] See D. Valentey and A. Kvasha, "Population Problems and Demographic Policy," in *Pravda* (Moscow), June 19, 1981, p. 2, which dealt with outmigration of young people from the Non-Black Earth Zone.

[6] See Table 1 of my paper for the "Symposium on the USSR and the Muslim World," held at Tel Aviv University, The Russian and East European Research Center, December 29–30, 1980; and Table 1 of Stephen Rapawy's unpublished paper, "Census Data on Nationality Composition and Language Characteristics of the Soviet Population: 1959, 1970, and 1979," Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, US Bureau of the Census, May 1980.

[7] Based on information provided by the US Department of State, the Embassy of Israel, and official statistical publications of the Federal Republic of Germany.

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insight into fertility trends from the 1979 Soviet census, which asked every woman how many children she had given birth to (the first such question on fertility in a Soviet census since 1926). This key question undoubtedly was included to permit development of a better picture of the actual fertility patterns of the population than can be obtained from current statistics or from sample surveys. Cross-tabulated by nationality, age, education, urban/rural residence, etc., this information would be extraordinarily important for any analysis of current and future fertility patterns. So far, however, such data have not been published, even in summary form.

In their absence, is there other evidence from the 1979 census that might provide insight into reasons for differential growth of Soviet nationalities and a slowing of population growth in the USSR as a whole? One set of clues can be found in published data on the distribution of the population by sex and in evidence regarding disturbing trends in male mortality.

2. A shortage of males. With the initial publication of partial census results, it was clear that something was affecting the population, particularly males, in a dramatic way. It was reported that, nationwide, males still constituted only 46.7 percent of the total population.[8] This is a very low share, with worldwide norms for developed countries falling in the range of 48 to 49 percent.[9]

To be sure, the male population of the Soviet Union experienced severe losses in World War II. At the time of the 1959 census, males still accounted for only 45.0 percent of the population. By 1970, the share had risen to 46.1 percent.

But, while the trend could have been expected to continue apace in the 1970–79 intercensal period with the birth of new cohorts (distributed normally according to sex) and the passing of older cohorts (distorted in sex distribution because of heavier wartime losses among males), it actually decelerated. The revised official figure for 1979 is 46.6 percent.[10] In arithmetic terms, this means that in 1970–79, the "recovery" rate of males slowed to slightly more than 50 percent the rate for 1959–70, after one adjusts for the different lengths of time between censuses (9 and 11 years respectively).

Further, there are striking differentials between the Slavic and Baltic north, on the one hand, and the Muslim and Transcaucasian south, on the other, with respect to the male share of the local population (see Table 1). While data for all major geographic areas reflect the same trend toward recovery (and the same slowing of this trend in the 1970–79 period), the "Slavic" republics (the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia) continue to lag far below normal percentages, thereby depressing the national figure. By contrast, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia appear to be close to normal distributions of males in the population.

The low levels for the Slavic republics in 1959 doubtless reflected the sharply disproportionate burden of wartime losses suffered in these areas. In addition, there was significant postwar migration of Russian males to other republics. But perpetuation of this deformation of normal distribution must have other explanations.

One very likely contributing factor may be an increased mortality rate among males, especially those in the prime working and military ages of 20–44, but also among those who had survived the war but in weak physical condition. (It might be noted that a rise in infant mortality observable in the Soviet Union in recent

Table 1. Males as Percent of Total USSR Population, by Republic, 1959, 1970, and 1979

	1959	1970	1979
"Slavic" republics:			
RSFSR	44.6	45.6	46
Ukraine	44.4	45.2	45.8
Belorussia	44.5	46.0	46.5
Moldavia	46.2	46.6	47.1
Baltic republics:			
Estonia	43.9	45.7	46.2
Latvia	43.9	45.7	46.1
Lithuania	45.9	46.9	47.2
Transcaucasus:			
Armenia	47.8	48.8	48.7
Azerbaydzhan	47.5	48.5	48.8
Georgia	46.1	47.0	47.1
Kazakhstan	47.5	48.1	48.3
Central Asia:			
Kirgiziya	47.2	47.8	48.0
Tadzhikistan	48.7	49.2	49.4
Turkmenistan	48.2	49.2	49
Uzbekistan	48.0	48.7	49.1
USSR	45.0	46.1	46.6

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: Data are from national and regional censuses. The figure for Turkmenistan in 1979 was provided to only 2 significant places. The figure for the RSFSR in 1979 is only approximate, because no republic-specific figure has yet been published; the approximation was made only to 2 significant places.

[8] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Apr. 22, 1979.

[9] Worldwide, more males than females are born—in a ratio of about 104 males to every 100 females. However, the survival rate of males is lower; therefore, there are, on average, 95 males for every 100 females.

[10] TsSU, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1979), Moscow, Statistika, 1980, p. 8.

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years[11] may also be having an input to male mortality, inasmuch as male infants tend to be weaker than female infants and hence more likely to die in infancy. While data regarding this phenomenon are for the USSR as a whole, the achievement of normal shares of the population by males in the Muslim areas suggests that the impact is unusually great in Slavic areas. What evidence of this trend can one cite?

First, it should be noted that the life expectancy at birth of Soviet males as a group has been declining. It was officially reported to have decreased sharply from 66 years on the average for 1965–66 to 64 years on the average for 1971–72.[12] Working from information that the crude death rate has been increasing beyond what might be expected from changes in the age structure of the population—in 1980 it was at 10.3 per 1,000 compared to 8.2 in 1970—and from death rates by age groups reported separately for males and females for 1973–74 and in combined form for 1975–76,[13] one can estimate the current life expectancy of males at age 0 to be as low as 62–63 years.

(It might be noted in passing that as of 1971–72 [the latest Soviet data available], the life expectancy of the average male in the Soviet Union at age 0 was 10 years shorter than that for the average female at age 0. Such a gap exceeded that for all other countries in the world except Gabon, according to United Nations' figures.[14] Updating of this statistic must await publication of the relevant information generated by the 1979 census.)

Between 1963–64 and 1973–74, the death rates of males of ages 20–44 increased from levels which were 2–2.5 times as high as those for females of the corresponding age groups to levels 3–3.5 times as high.[15] What is to explain this situation? Doubtless, a major factor is the continued increase in alcoholism—estimated to have grown at the rate of 4.4 percent a year between 1955 and 1979. While increasing numbers of young people and women in the Soviet Union are falling victim to this disease, the problem remains greatest among adult males.[16] In this regard, there was a virtual doubling of coronary disease death rates for the USSR in the period 1960–78, partly attributable to an increase in ischemic heart disease, which has been linked to alcohol consumption.[17]



Stopping for a drink of wine at a shop along Moscow's Gorkiy Street.

—EUPRA.

More evidence on excessive male mortality was provided by a round table on family problems run by *Nedelya*—the Sunday supplement of *Izvestiya*—early in 1981. At the meeting, A. Volkov, the head of the Depart-

[11] On the rise in infant mortality, see Christopher Davis and Murray Feshbach, *Rising Infant Mortality in the USSR in the 1970's*, Series P-95, No. 74, Washington, DC, Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce, June 1980.

[12] TsSU SSSR, *Naseleniye SSSR—chislennost', sostav, i dvizheniye naseleniya—1973, statisticheskiy sbornik* (Population of the USSR—Number, Composition, and Migration of the Population—1973, Statistical Compendium), Moscow, Statistika, 1975, p. 139.

[13] *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 12, December 1975, p. 84; and ibid., No. 12, December 1977, p. 76.

[14] United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook 1978*, 3rd ed., New York, NY, 1979, Table 22, pp. 396–417.

[15] TsSU, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1964), Moscow, Statistika, 1965, pp. 36–37; and *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 12, December 1975, p. 84.

[16] See Vladimir G. Treml, *Alcohol in the USSR: A Statistical Study*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1982 (forthcoming). Dr. Treml also has uncovered evidence of incredible rates of poisoning from defective alcohol and other causes in the USSR. In 1976, for example, 40,000 persons—largely males of working age—died from acute alcohol poisoning. This number is 100 times that for the United States (400), or more than 88 times the US rate per 100,000 population (15.9 vs. 0.18). See his "Death from Alcohol Poisoning in the USSR," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Nov. 10, 1981. Treml cites evidence of inadequate medical treatment in this area.

[17] Coronary heart disease death rates per 100,000 population for the USSR were 247.3 in 1960 and 500.0 in 1978. See John Dutton Jr., "Changes in Soviet Mortality Patterns, 1959–77," *Population and Development Review* (New York, NY), Vol. 5, No. 2, June 1979. On the linkage between alcohol abuse and ischemic heart disease, see John R. DeLuca, Ed., *Fourth Special Report to the US Congress on Alcohol and Health, US Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Association, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, January 1981.

It might be noted that over the same period (1960–78), deaths rates from coronary disease in the United States declined from 515.1 per 100,000 to 442.7. See US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service, *Mortality Trends for Leading Causes of Death, U.S., 1950–69*, DHEW No. (HRD) 74–1853, Series 20, No. 16, Washington, DC, pp. 60–61; *Monthly Vital Statistics Report, Final Mortality Statistics*, 1978, DHHS Publication, No. (PHS) 80–1120, Vol. 29, No. 6, Sept. 17, 1980.

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Table 2. USSR Population Aged 0 to 9 Years, by Republic, 1979

	Total population, in thousands	Population with higher education, in thousands	Number per thousand aged 10 or older with higher education	Implicit population aged 10 or older, in thousands	Derived population aged 0 to 9, in thousands	Those aged 0 to 9 as a percent of total
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
"Slavic" republics:						
RSFSR	137,410	8,312	71	117,070	20,340	14.80
Ukraine	49,609	2,766	65	42,554	7,055	14.22
Belorussia	9,533	512	63	8,127	1,406	14.75
Moldavia	3,950	169	52	3,250	700	17.72
Baltic republics:						
Estonia	1,464	93	74	1,257	207	14.14
Latvia	2,503	160	74	2,162	341	13.62
Lithuania	3,391	174	61	2,852	539	15.90
Transcaucasus:						
Armenia	3,037	219	91	2,407	630	20.74
Azerbaydzhan	6,027	301	65	4,631	1,396	23.16
Georgia	4,993	425	103	4,126	867	17.36
Kazakhstan	14,684	679	60	11,317	3,367	22.93
Central Asia:						
Kirgiziya	3,523	150	57	2,632	891	25.29
Tadzhikistan	3,806	130	49	2,653	1,153	30.29
Turkmenistan	2,765	104	53	1,962	803	29.04
Uzbekistan	15,389	632	58	10,897	4,492	29.19
USSR	262,085	14,826	68	218,029	44,056	16.81

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: Data in columns 1–3 are reported in *Vestnik statistiki* (Moscow), June 1980, pp. 41, 43–46, and in ibid., January 1981, p. 63. Column 4 equals Column 2 times 1,000 divided by Column 3. Column 5 equals Column 1 minus Column 4. Column 6 equals Column 5 divided by Column 1.

ment of Demography of the Central Statistical Administration's own Research Institute, revealed that premature deaths of males exceeded divorces as a reason why women became heads of households. Ages were not given, but presumably Volkov must have been referring to males in the age range of 30 to 50 years when he reported that there were 8 million such early male deaths between the 1970 and 1979 censuses.[18] No wonder the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is paying so much attention to family and health problems.[19]

3. Distribution of population aged 0 to 9. Turning from deaths to live births—perhaps the most significant indicator of future population trends—we find indirect evidence of sharp regional imbalances in the share of children aged 0 to 9 years. The need to resort to indirect calculations stems from a remarkable Soviet silence regarding such census data.

There is no question that the data exist. Indeed, the 1979 census was more comprehensive in its questioning on the matter of age than were its two predecessors. In addition to asking the number of years since birth, the 1979 questionnaire also asked for the year of birth and for whether the birth occurred before or after January 17 of the given year.[20] Clearly, census officials understood the need for improved age data.

Moreover, the USSR Council of Ministers' guidelines for the conduct of the 1979 census specifically included age data among the information to be processed and published.[21] During 1979, the deputy chief of the Central Statistical Administration of the Armenian SSR confirmed that

Data concerning the composition of the population according to sex, age, nationality, language, level of

[18] Cited in Yelena Mushkina, "Family Service and Demography, Report from a Meeting of *Nedelya*'s Public Council," *Nedelya* (Moscow), Jan. 12–18, 1981, pp. 2–3, translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Jan. 12–18, 1981, p. 8.

[19] See Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the November 1981 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, *Izvestiya*, Nov. 17, 1981, and "The Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1981–85 and for the Period Through 1990," adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress and published in *Pravda*, Mar. 5, 1981.

[20] Author's copy of the 1979 Soviet census schedule form.

[21] *Sobraniye postanovleniy SSSR* (Moscow), No. 4, 1978, Article 25, pp. 76–82.

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education, family situation, and distribution by sector and social group will soon be obtained and published.[22]

There has been no indication of any hardware or software problems in the processing of census data. Therefore, it may be deduced that publication of age data has been held up for reasons of policy.

It is possible, however, to penetrate the Soviet silence on the matter of age distribution by examining census materials published on educational attainment. The two sets of data needed to piece together the regional age distributions for the population 10 years of age and older and for the population 0 to 9 years old were provided in the June 1980 and January 1981 issues of *Vestnik statistiki.* The first contained data on educational attainment by level of education in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the employed population 10 years of age and older, for the USSR and by republic. The second provided census data on the employed population for the USSR and by republic in absolute terms.[23] Working from these data, we can derive estimates for the distribution of cohorts aged 0 to 9 as of 1979. The derivation and results are given in Table 2, on the opposite page. (A similar procedure was applied to 1970 data in the case of the USSR and the RSFSR. For both, the derived estimates came within 1 percent of the corresponding reported absolute figures.)

As can be seen in Table 2, the proportion of the population aged 0 to 9 years varied sharply from republic to republic in 1979. These age cohorts accounted for only 14–16 percent of the population in each of the Slavic and Baltic republics, while comprising 29–30 percent of the population in Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

What is of even greater significance is the trends in these data over time. In Table 3, I have compared the 1979 proportions with the corresponding information from 1959 and 1970. This comparison highlights a sharp decline in the proportion of young persons in the European republics and the persistence of high proportions of young people in the Muslim republics, a sign of continued high fertility in the latter. Of the four Central Asian republics, only Kirgiziya saw its share of children aged 0 to 9 drop more than roughly one percentage point from 1959 to 1979, an anomalous trend that probably reflects the large presence in that republic (particularly in the capital city, Frunze) of non-Muslims having lower fertility.[24]

Another way of describing the trend is to compare absolute figures. As can be seen in Table 4, on page 34, the youngest age groups experienced sharp declines in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia in the period 1959–79, in contrast with sharp increases in their ranks in the predominantly Muslim republics of Azerbaydzhan, Kazakhstan, Kirgiziya, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In 1959, the combined total population aged 0 to 9 in these six republics equaled 30 percent of the figure for persons of the same age in the RSFSR; in 1970, 52 percent; and in 1979, 59 percent.

Based on estimates and projections made in 1977 by Godfrey Baldwin of the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the US Bureau of the Census,[25] one can estimate that by the year 2000, the youngest cohorts of the six Muslim republics will total some 85 percent of the total for cohorts of the same 0 to 9 years of age in the RSFSR. These youngsters in turn will be the progenitors of the USSR's population in the next century, of the future labor force and of military manpower in the USSR.

Table 3. Trends in Share of USSR Population Aged 0 to 9 Years, by Republic, 1959, 1970, and 1979

(in percent)

	1959	1970	1979
"Slavic" republics:			
RSFSR	21.92	16.36	14.80
Ukraine	18.85	15.98	14.22
Belorussia	21.95	18.37	14.75
Moldavia	25.78	20.56	17.72
Baltic republics:			
Estonia	15.81	14.61	14.14
Latvia	15.09	14.75	13.62
Lithuania	18.68	18.02	15.90
Transcaucasus:			
Armenia	29.02	25.76	20.74
Azerbaydzhan	29.36	30.39	23.16
Georgia	21.48	20.18	17.36
Kazakhstan	27.81	25.25	22.93
Central Asia:			
Kirgiziya	29.48	28.78	25.29
Tadzhikistan	30.75	33.51	30.29
Turkmenistan	30.36	31.89	29.04
Uzbekistan	30.19	31.77	29.19
USSR	22.20	18.61	16.81

SOURCES: For 1959 and 1970, TsSU SSSR, *Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census), Vol. 2, Moscow, Statistika, 1972, pp. 12–73. For 1979, Table 2 above.

[22] V. Zulayan, in *Kommunist* (Yerevan), Aug. 9, 1979. Emphasis added.

[23] That the latter excludes employment in the private subsidiary agricultural sector is not germane, because the calculation is performed with the data given and not the total employment figure.

[24] *Itogi 1970,* Vol. 4, 1973, p. 290.

[25] Godfrey S. Baldwin, *Population Projections by Age and Sex: For the Republics and Major Economic Regions of the USSR, 1970 to 2000,* Series P-91, No. 26, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, September 1979.

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Table 4. Population Aged 0 to 9 Years, by Republic, 1959–79

	1959 (thousands)	1970 (thousands)	1979 (thousands)	Change, 1959–79 (percent)
"Slavic" republics:				
RSFSR	25,768	21,286	20,340	–21.06
Ukraine	7,890	7,533	7,055	–10.58
Belorussia	1,768	1,654	1,406	–20.48
Moldavia	744	734	700	–5.91
Baltic republics:				
Estonia	189	198	207	9.52
Latvia	316	337	341	7.91
Lithuania	507	564	539	6.31
Transcaucasus:				
Armenia	512	642	630	23.05
Azerbaydzhan	1,086	1,555	1,396	28.55
Georgia	869	946	867	–2.30
Kazakhstan	2,585	3,285	3,367	30.25
Central Asia:				
Kirgiziya	609	844	891	46.31
Tadzhikistan	609	972	1,153	89.33
Turkmenistan	460	688	803	74.57
Uzbekistan	2,451	3,748	4,492	83.27
USSR	46,362	44,986	44,056	–4.97

SOURCES: For 1959 and 1970, TsSU SSSR, *Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census), Vol. 2, Moscow, Statistika, 1972, pp. 12–73. For 1979, Table 2 above.

4. The problem of aging. Yet another way of understanding the demographic problems facing the USSR is to examine what appears to be a dramatic general, if regionally differentiated, aging of the population due to different trends in fertility and—to a lesser extent—in mortality. Again, we would like more details on the actual age structure by republic and by nationality, but until (or unless) such becomes available, we will have to make do.

Nationwide, the share of the population in the officially defined pension ages (males 60 and over and females 55 and over) grew from 10.4 percent in 1950 to roughly 15 percent in 1970, and it is projected by Western observers to reach 19.1 percent in 2000. By 1970, the figure for the RSFSR was 15 percent, and it is expected to increase to 22 percent in the year 2000. For the four Central Asian republics, where the birthrate remains high, the share of this population group is expected to *drop,* from 10 percent in 1970 to 8 percent in the year 2000.[26]

The aging of the Soviet population can also be seen in data and projections with regard to the average age of a Soviet citizen. From 28.7 years in 1975, it is likely to reach 33.1 years by 2000. For the RSFSR, the comparable figures are 31.1 and 37.1 for the years 1975 and 2000; and for Uzbekistan, 17.8 and 20.7.[27]

The problem of aging of the population has a particular salience in the countryside. This "deformation"—and the term itself is employed by Soviet demographers—has been particularly disturbing in the 29 oblasts and autonomous republics (ASSR) of the RSFSR that comprise the Non-Black Earth Zone, on whose development Moscow places such hopes for increasing the food supply of the Soviet Union.[28] Having succeeded in past policies designed to increase the urban labor force, Soviet authorities are now hard put to reverse signals and entice young persons, especially those trained to handle machinery, back to the countryside.

Continued Soviet concern about the "deformation" of the rural age structure indicates that adverse trends noted earlier persist. For example, between 1959 and 1970, the number of persons aged 20–24 in the rural population of the RSFSR dropped by almost 50 percent; those 25–29, by more than 50 percent; and those 30–34, by roughly 20 percent. (By contrast, for the same period, the reduction among those aged 20–24 and 25–29 in the rural population of Uzbekistan was only about 20 percent, and the number of those aged 30–34 actually increased by 14 percent.[29]) Unless the census officials publish age data for the rural population by republic and oblast, we must settle for something less than precise knowledge about this important demographic problem area.

The drop in the number of young adults in the countryside, of course, also adversely affects the fertility of the rural population. This may help account for the remarkable fact that the crude birthrates in rural areas of Belorussia have for many years been lower than those in urban localities in that republic.[30]

In the Ukraine, declines in numbers of young adults in the countryside may be contributing to the deceleration

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] See fn 5. The Non-Black Earth Zone comprises 24 oblasts and 5 autonomous soviet socialist republics, all in the Russian republic. These include the total area of the Northwest, Central, and Volga-Vyatka economic regions, plus Kaliningradskaya, Sverdlovskaya, and Permskaya oblasts and the Udmurtskaya ASSR. In the Northwest region are Arkhangel'skaya, Leningradskaya, Murmanskaya, Novgorodskaya, Pskovskaya, and Vologodskaya oblasts, plus the Karel'skaya and Komi ASSR's; in the Central region, Bryanskaya, Ivanovskaya, Kalininskaya, Kaluzhskaya, Kostromskaya, Moskovskaya, Orlovskaya, Ryazanskaya, Smolenskaya, Tul'skaya, Vladimirskaya, and Yaroslavskaya oblasts; in the Volga-Vyatka region, Gor'kovskaya, Kirovskaya, and Mordovskaya oblasts, plus the Chuvashskaya and Mariyskaya ASSR's.

[29] *Itogi 1970,* Vol. 2, 1972, pp. 19–75.

[30] TsSU Belorusskoy SSR, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo Belorusskoy SSSR, statisticheskiy yezhegodnik* (National Economy of the Belorussian SSR, Statistical Yearbook), Minsk, Belorus', 1980, p. 15.

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

The reading hall of a boarding house for pensioners in Moscow, pictured in June 1981.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

in overall growth of population of Ukrainian nationality. While we still lack data on migration and on the age structure of the population of the Ukrainian SSR, there is a strong possibility that the slowing growth of Ukrainians results not only from cultural assimilation with the Russians but from the flight from rural localities of population in the child-bearing ages and their settlement in urban areas where fertility rates tend to decrease.

Implications for the Future

What are the long-term implications of the demographic trends in the USSR discussed above? In terms of ethnic distribution, the Great Russians may be expected to continue their decline as a share of the Soviet population. In 1959, they were 54.6 percent of the total; in 1970, 53.4 percent; and in 1979, 52.4 percent. By the year 2000, the figure may be 46–48 percent. Overall, the Soviet Union might even face a stagnation in growth or even a downturn in total population, with important implications for manpower and the economy.

In order to understand the importance of the last matters, it may be useful to project Soviet total population out to the year 2000 and on to 2050 based on five different constant hypothetical fertility rates: 1.0, 1.8, 2.0, 2.2, and 3.0 children per woman. Such a set of projections is presented in Table 5, on page 36. I have employed a model developed at the Center for Population Research at Georgetown University's Kennedy Institute of Ethics for projecting the population in less-developed countries.[31] The projections assume that mortality levels by age group will remain constant throughout the period, at the level reported in 1975–76.[32] To be sure, the projections may well prove low if the health of the Soviet population increases dramatically. But, if not? In light of recent mortality trends, the health situation may worsen before it improves. Therefore, the assumption of constant mortality rates over the 70-year period of the projections seems reasonable. Even a modest improvement of life expectancy would not change the relative dimensions of the projections.

Speculative though the projections in Table 5 may be, they provide a basis for comparing the dramatic impact that different future fertility rates may have on the size of the total population and, implicitly, on its age structure. Depending on whether Soviet women on average bear 1

[31] I am deeply indebted to Mr. Richard K. Collins of Georgetown University's Center for Population Research for his assistance in this matter.

[32] *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 12, Dec. 1977, p. 76.

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or 3 children, total population in the USSR may vary by a factor of 2:1 in the year 2000 and by as much as 4.5:1 in the year 2050.

Looking first at the year 2000—only 20 years hence—we find that if there were today an instantaneous drop in average fertility to 1 child per woman, population would end up at 267.1 million, or slightly below the current estimate of 267.8 million. This projection is much lower than the latest projection of Soviet population for the year 2000 made by Godfrey Baldwin (300–302 million).[33] The latter projection can be derived from the model used here if we assume that each woman will have 1.8 children, which is very close to the current estimate for fertility in the RSFSR (1.9 children per woman), an estimate based on Soviet statistics.[34] With higher fertility rates, the population would become younger in the year 2000, as on the average more children would be born. With 2 children per woman and all other things being equal, there would be 311.1 million persons in 2000. If the current estimated nationwide fertility rate of 2.2 children per woman[35] remained unchanged, the population would total 317.1 million, and with 3 children per woman for the entire Soviet female population of child-bearing age, there would be 355.1 million. However, any expectation that Slavic and Baltic women will suddenly revert to fertility behavior of the long distant past, comparable to that of Muslim women at the present time, is highly problematic.

As we look out to the year 2050, the possible shifts become even more dramatic. The projected population varies from 139.0 million to 632.2 million, depending on whether fertility is at 1 child or 3 children per woman. Since the population ceases to reproduce itself at levels of fertility below 2.65 and since the current estimated fertility of 2.2 children per woman in the USSR appears

Table 5. Projection of Total Soviet Population to 2050, Based on Different Fertility Hypotheses

(population in millions as of mid-year)

	Assuming the following constant rates of fertility—i.e., number of children per woman aged 15–49				
	(1.0)	*(1.8)*	*(2.0)*	*(2.2)*	*(3.0)*
Projections:					
for 2000	267.1	302.3	311.1	317.1	355.1
for 2025	217.2	303.5	328.3	346.6	471.0
for 2050	139.0	273.2	319.8	355.5	632.2

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: These projections were based on the reported Soviet population of 241.6 million in 1970 and an estimated 1980 USSR population of 267.8 million based on the 1979 census results and derived using the Center for Population Research model mentioned in the text.



Part of an increasingly precious Soviet resource: infant Slava Anisimov, in the arms of his pediatrician in a leading children's polyclinic in Leningrad.
—TASS via EUPRA.

to be dropping, one can expect the actual population in 2050 to be toward the lower end of the range, although there may not be quite the halving of the year-2000 level that would occur with a fertility of 1. As the figures in the table indicate, fertility of 1.8 would result in a drop of some 29 million persons between 2000 and 2050.

All of these projections assume constancy of certain important variables—fertility and mortality. But experience tells us that matters demographic are not so predictable. As late as 1976, a Soviet source was citing an earlier official projection of 270–280 million for the total population of the USSR in the year 1980 and 340–350 million for the year 2000.[36] The figure for 1980 turned out to be closer to 267 million, and current Western projections for the year 2000 see the Soviet population totaling only 300–302 million. As suggested above, this unanticipated deceleration in population growth apparently resulted from sharp reductions in fertility and male life expectancy, and also from increases in infant mortality.

* * *

Soviet officialdom is clearly aware of the problems discussed above. This was evidenced in the attention paid to the slowing growth of the population in speeches at the 26th CPSU Congress in early 1981.[37] More sig-

[33] Unpublished estimates and projections prepared by Baldwin in the spring of 1980.

[34] See information in *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 11, November 1980, p. 76.

[35] Based on information in ibid.

[36] Ye. V. Ovechnikov and M. S. Fishel'son, *Gorodskoy transport* (Urban Transportation), Moscow, Vysshaya shkola, 1976, p. 4.

[37] See fn. 19.

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nificant, the concern voiced there was followed up in short order by two pieces of implementing pronatalist legislation, in March and September.[38] That the Russian leadership of the Soviet Union is concerned not only about overall Soviet population trends, but also about disparities among growth rates of different ethnic groups (i.e., Slavs and Muslims) was clear in the regionally differentiated timetables for applying new, partially paid leave to women staying at home to care for newborn children in the regulations announced in September 1981.[39]

Only time will tell whether these or other policies will have any success in reversing or modifying what Moscow sees as adverse trends in population growth and distribution. However, in an important sense such policies are already too late: that is, any changes in fertility today are changes for the 21st century. Children born next year comprise the manpower pool from which the Soviet military force will be drafted in the year 2000 and from which the Soviet labor force of the first decades of the next century will be drawn.

Thus, Soviet decision-makers today must be deeply engrossed in determining what to do about a clearly indicated burgeoning of Muslim population and a decline in Slavic population over the next 20 years. The difficulties this trend presents and the uncertainties over how to respond to it may go far toward explaining the failure of Soviet officials to release sensitive census data on fertility and age structure that would give greater publicity to these intractable problems.

[38] "On Measures for Strengthening State Aid to Families with Children," *Pravda*, Mar. 31, 1981; and "In the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, USSR Council of Ministers, and AUCCTU," ibid., Sept. 6, 1981.

[39] The liberalized leave allowances were to go into effect in November 1981 in portions of the RSFSR (Siberia, the Far East, and certain other northern provinces) and would become effective in Soviet Central Asia only in 1983. See *Pravda*, Sept. 6, 1981.

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The USSR and Pakistan

by William E. Griffith

Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia—to many these words breathe only a sense of utter remoteness, a memory of strange vicissitudes and of moribund romance. To me, I confess, they are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the domination of the world.

—George Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India[1]

One day last August, I visited a large, well-kept Afghan refugee camp in Pakistan about 15 miles from the border of Afghanistan, on the road from Quetta to Qandahar.[2] That evening I was to dine with a Baluch acquaintance whom I had first seen some seven years before, on the day in Quetta that three Baluch students had unsuccessfully tried to blow up the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. At that earlier juncture, a Baluch tribal rebellion was winding down, no match for the Pakistan army and some Iranian helicopters that the Shahanshah of Iran had sent to aid it. The Soviet Union had been thrown out of Egypt and was beginning to lose ground in Iraq; the alarm in the West about the Persian Gulf was mostly about its rulers pushing up petroleum prices, rather than about the Soviet Union threatening to take it over.

Driving back toward Quetta that hot August afternoon, past hilly, desert land and herds of camels, I thought how much had changed in so short a time. The Shah was gone, replaced by a fanatical Shi'i theocracy which hated Moscow and Washington with equal fury. Nearer where I was that afternoon, the Soviet army was on the southern borders of Afghanistan. The Red Air Force was therefore only 500 miles from the Strait of Hormuz and could now give fighter cover to Soviet bombers over it. And in Baluchistan . . . ?

That evening, talking with my Baluch acquaintance while eating, from the linoleum floor, an elaborate and very spicy Baluch dinner, I asked him what he thought the prospects were for an independent Baluchistan. Very few, he replied, unless there was outside aid, which he did not seem soon to expect. (He had himself, several years ago when I saw him last, thought the prospects for it much more favorable.)

Indeed, my impressions in Quetta in 1981, as in 1980, were of considerably greater stability than existed in 1974, when I was first there. While there is no political participation, economic development has increased, and the Governor General, Lt. Gen. Rahimuddin Khan, has followed a moderate policy. Moreover, the memory of the ruthless suppression of the rising in the early 1970's is still fresh. Nothing fails, after all, like failure. All in all, therefore, while Baluchi insurgency may revive, the memory of failure will probably restrain it for some time more, unless the Soviets aid it massively—which seems doubtful.[3]

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[1] Quoted in Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Afghanistan: The Imperial Dream," *The New York Review of Books,* (New York, NY), Feb. 21, 1980.

[2] This essay is based primarily on travels in Pakistan and the Middle East in the summers of 1980 and 1981, for which I am grateful to *The Reader's Digest,* of which I am a roving editor, and to its editor-in-chief, Edward T. Thompson, who sponsored my travels. I have also profited from conversations in the Soviet Union in April, June, and December 1981; from discussion with Steven Rittenberg and Irwin Selnick of Columbia University in November 1981 on South Asian and Central Asian matters; from many talks with my friend Zalmay Khalilzad of Columbia University; and from conversations with my MIT colleague, Myron Weiner.

[3] My estimate here differs from that in Selig Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations,* Washington, DC; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981. That said, however, the book is a mine of information on Baluch separatism, and especially on the neglected area of Iranian Baluchistan.

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

Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq addresses an extraordinary session of foreign ministers of the Islamic Conference that opened in Islamabad on January 27, 1980, to discuss the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Seated is M. Habib Chatti, Secretary General of the Islamic Congress, who presided over the opening session.

—Chip Hires/Gamma-Liaison.

The Strategic Setting

Aficionados of Rudyard Kipling will remember that Russia's drive toward the Indian subcontinent did not begin with Lenin. What Kipling indelibly christened the "great game," the struggle between Russia and Great Britain for dominance in Central and Southern Asia, was long a major motor of the collision between Russia's southward and Great Britain's eastward expansion. As so often elsewhere, the legacy of this struggle was that the borders of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (at the time, part of Great Britain's Indian Empire), were drawn in border wars and the diplomatic maneuverings of *Realpolitik*. For our purposes here, only two points need to be made. First, because Russia and Great Britain found Afghanistan so difficult to conquer, because each was determined that the other would not absorb it, and because in the early part of this century they were pushed together by their common fear of the rising threat of Imperial Germany, the two powers in 1907 decided that Afghanistan should be neutralized, with Great Britain predominant in foreign policy. Second, the boundaries of Afghanistan and the Indian Empire, in part by Russian and British design, split ethnic groups: Uzbeks and Tajiks in Afghanistan and Russia, and Pathans and Baluch in Afghanistan and what is now Pakistan. This situation gave ammunition for future irredentist struggles.

As Winston Churchill foresaw with impassioned, imperial clarity, Britain's 1947 retreat from India meant the end of her control of the Indian Army, and therefore of her empire. Thus, the Indian subcontinent and the Persian Gulf became vacuums at a time when Soviet military power was beginning to grow. In the 1960's and early 1970's, moreover, the United States was first absorbed in the Vietnam war and then largely immobilized in foreign policy by the war's aftermath.

Before that, however, the patterns of post-1947 Soviet and American alliances and alignments in the area had been set. Moscow chose India, and Washington chose Pakistan—or, more accurately, India chose Moscow, and Pakistan chose Washington. Since then, each superpower has tried, intermittently and always unsuccessfully, to reach its maximum goal: to influence both states at the same time. But the inveterate hostility between India and Pakistan has made this impossible.

The other major regional tendency has been for India to become more powerful and Pakistan less so. To Pakistan, and to Muslims in general, it has seemed both unexpected and unnatural that the despised Hindus should accomplish this—that Islam should prove an insufficient bond between West and East Pakistan; that India should stage a nuclear explosion and begin an impressive space program; that India's industrial growth and technological progress should be higher than Pakistan's; that Pakistan should lose every war with India. Is it any wonder that Pakistan has always lived under the fear of another defeat by India? Or that India has consistently resented, especially since its defeat of Pakistan in 1971, the refusal, as New Delhi has seen it, of the United States, in contrast to the eagerness of the Soviet Union, to accept Indian predominance in the subcontinent?

More recently, two other developments have altered the attitude of the superpowers toward the subcontinent. One has been the changing perspectives of Moscow and Washington in regard to China; the other has been their increasing involvement in the Middle East, with respect to which Pakistan has become important but India has not.

The hostility of both Moscow and Washington to Beijing from 1959 until 1971 was bound to give way, in light

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Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's visit to India in December 1980: at the left, Brezhnev is greeted at the airport by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi; at the right, New Delhi's Afghan population expresses its views on Soviet policy in Afghanistan.

—François Lochon/Gamma-Liaison.

of Soviet-American tension and the Sino-Soviet split, to a Sino-American entente to contain rising Soviet power. This has now become a triple entente, with Japan the third, reluctant, junior partner—a genuinely major development in international affairs. In the subcontinent, its net result has been, as we can now see, to drive India closer to the Soviet Union, and Pakistan, to the United States.

Yet one must at once make two main caveats. First, India never has been, and in all likelihood never will be, a "satellite" of the Soviet Union; rather, it is a partial ally. Second, Pakistan is a partial, recent, reluctant, and suspicious ally of the United States. Islamabad feels that until the Reagan administration, Washington had proved itself unwilling to be a faithful ally of Pakistan and, worse, had often—in providing aid to India in 1962, denying aid to Pakistan in 1971, and opposing Pakistan's nuclear plans—worked contrary to Pakistan's interests.

Soviet Policy in South Asia

It will be noted that I approach developments in the subcontinent since 1947 primarily from the Indian and Pakistani viewpoints, rather than treating the two South Asian states as pawns successfully manipulated by one or the other of the superpowers. It follows that I also view Soviet policy toward the region—in fact throughout the Third World—as essentially reactive, not initiatory of developments.[4] To put it another way, the Soviet Union recognizes and exploits opportunities for expanding its influence in the Third World, but it seldom creates them. It does not operate according to some master timetable for world conquest. Certainly, its objectives and methods are influenced by the combination of Russian history and Marxist-Leninist ideology which make up the Soviet foreign policy tradition. Certainly, the Soviet Union moves with "all deliberate speed" to accomplish its aims. Yet students of Soviet history know that, with the exception of such aberrations as the Cuban missile crisis—staged, after all, by the "hairbrained schemer" Nikita Khrushchev—the Soviet leadership normally has been cautious and not inclined to adventurous risk-taking.

Indeed, Marxism-Leninism, because it makes its high priests believe in the ultimate victory of socialism throughout the world, requires them only to help speed it up. Khrushchev hoped at first to accomplish this end by his economic and arms support of such Third World leaders as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sukarno, Ahmed Ben Bella, and Kwame Nkrumah. But the overthrow of many of them in the 1960's by military juntas led Soviet theorists and, presumably, the Soviet Politburo to move again to a preference for revolutionary regimes directed by "vanguard," self-proclaimed "scientific socialist" (although not yet in Soviet termi-

[4] See Robert H. Donaldson, Ed., *The Soviet Union and the Third World: Successes and Failures*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1981.

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nology "Marxist-Leninist") parties. Thus, the Soviet favorites today are South Yemen, Afghanistan, Angola, and, provisionally, Ethiopia (where Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam seems to be resisting Soviet pressure to set up a ruling "vanguard" party.[5]) Moreover, the Soviet military buildup has also rendered it easier for Moscow to help put and keep in power such revolutionary regimes, rather than *nolens volens* to accept less reliable substitutes.

In any event, Soviet hostility to China and the United States, and India's resources, power, secularism, leftist, anti-American tendencies, and key position in the non-aligned movement rendered Moscow's de facto alliance with India natural. This alliance was confirmed by, as it in part encouraged, Pakistan's alliances with the United Sates and China. From time to time, to be sure, the Soviet Union has also tried to improve its relations with Pakistan—notably, by its 1965 Tashkent mediation between India and Pakistan. But it has rarely succeeded, and Islamabad has understandably figured less importantly than New Delhi in Moscow's calculations.[6]

It would be provincially subcontinental, however, to think that Moscow's privileged relationship with New Delhi is comparable, on the global or even the Asian scale, to Pakistan's ties with the Sino-American-Japanese entente. India is certainly stronger than Pakistan, but it is so much weaker than the triple entente that the post-1971 Indian claim to predominance on the subcontinent (initially but, as it turned out, only briefly recognized by the Carter administration), has been overridden by the American naval and air buildup in the Indian Ocean—and, indeed, by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

This American buildup originated out of Washington's concern to insure the security of oil deliveries through the Strait of Hormuz and, for that purpose, to maintain the stability of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms. More generally, the "extended Middle East" has become increasingly central in American as well as in Soviet policy.

From this viewpoint, Pakistan should be essential to American policy, and hence dangerous to Soviet purposes. Pakistan is Muslim, geographically close to the Gulf, and has a large number of trained military personnel and much surplus labor.

Over the last decade, moreover, Pakistan has become tied much more closely to the Middle East. It now receives about US$2 billion yearly in remittances from Pakistani workers in the Gulf. Pakistani military personnel, seconded or on contract, play a major role in the armed forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms, and even as far afield as Libya. Indeed, some reports indicate that a substantial Pakistani military force is about to be sent to Saudi Arabia, where it is bound to have an important part in ensuring the stability of the rule of the Saudi royal family. Thus, from the standpoint of the Soviet Union, Pakistan is exercising an increasingly negative influence in Middle Eastern politics, while for the United States, Pakistan, because of its new Middle Eastern role, has become more important, and India less so.[7]

Moscow and Islamabad

By far the most significant event in Soviet-Pakistani relations in the recent past has been the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I have written elsewhere on recent Afghan developments;[8] therefore, I shall treat them here only insofar as they affect Soviet-Pakistani relations.

Ever since the establishment of Pakistan, there has been tension between Islamabad and Kabul over the issue of "Greater Pushtunistan." Briefly, the Pakistani-Afghan border, the so-called Durand line, was drawn by the British in the 19th century according to the time-tested imperial rule of *divide et impera.* It split the Pathans between Afghanistan and what was then the British Indian Empire. (The same was true, to a much lesser extent, with respect to the Baluch.) The Afghan elite, largely Pathan, has long been anxious to "recover" the Pathan part of Pakistan, which includes much of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province—including its capital, Peshawar. Indeed, the US alliance with Pakistan in the Central Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization pushed Afghanistan

[5] Paul B. Henze, "Communism and Ethiopia," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1981.

[6] For Soviet views of Pakistan, see especially the various works by the leading Soviet expert on it, Yu. V. Gankovskiy of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. His *The Peoples of Pakistan,* which is available in English (Lahore, People's Publishing House, n.d), includes an extensive bibliography, largely in Russian. For an authoritative and more general Soviet statement, see Ye. M. Primakov (director of the Institute of Oriental Studies), "The USSR and the Developing Countries," *Journal of International Affairs* (New York, NY), Fall/Winter 1980/81. The same issue of this journal contains an important article on Soviet policy toward India by Robert H. Donaldson, "The Soviet Union in South Asia: A Friend to Rely Upon?," and two articles on Soviet Middle Eastern policy by Karen Dawisha and Robert O. Freedman.

[7] As a consequence of Pakistan's Middle Eastern role, I do not share the subcontinental perspective that Selig Harrison sets forth in "Fanning the Flames in South Asia," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Winter 1981/82.

[8] William E. Griffith, "Super-power Relations After Afghanistan," *Survival* (London), July/August 1980. See also Zalmay Khalilzad, "Afghanistan and the Crisis in American Foreign Policy," ibid. For the current situation, see "Russia in Afghanistan," *The Economist* (London), May 23, 1981; for historical background, see Kazemzadeh, loc. cit. See also the general survey of recent Afghan developments by Wolfgang Berner and Gerd Linde in Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, *Sowjetunion 1980/1981* (Soviet Union 1980/1981), Munich, Hanser, 1981, pp. 280–89.

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Civilian and military refugees from Afghanistan at a camp in northwestern Pakistan.

—US government photo.

toward the Soviet Union, and therefore further exacerbated Soviet-Pakistani relations.

When Mohammad Daoud came to power in Kabul in the early 1970's, he also initially followed the "Greater Pushtunistan" policy. But toward the end of his rule, in the year or two before he was overthrown in 1978, he began to try to increase his freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by improving his relations with Pakistan and Iran. With the coming to power in Kabul of Nur Mohammad Taraki and the Khalq, however, Afghan relations with Pakistan rapidly worsened again, and Kabul resumed its "Greater Pushtunistan" propaganda. Moreover, the tribal rebellion which soon broke out in Afghanistan resulted in an increasing flow of Afghan refugees to Pakistan.

After Taraki and the Khalq took over in Kabul, Moscow began to question the Durand line, and this stance produced a deterioration of Soviet-Pakistani relations. But it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 that sharply worsened these relations.

The Soviet invasion had several consequences of relevance here. It brought the Soviet army for the first time to the borders of Pakistan. It greatly increased the flow of Afghan refugees into Pakistan, where there are now something more than a million. It highlighted the activities of the Afghan rebel leaders in Pakistan. Not only do the leaders of the principal rebel groups live in Pakistan, but many of the rebels themselves, having brought out their women and children to the Pakistan refugee camps, regularly go back and forth across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to fight the Soviet invaders and what is left of the Afghan army. Finally, Western reports indicate that Western and Chinese arms aid to the rebels is being channeled regularly through Pakistan.[9] It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Soviet Union regards the present Pakistani government as one of its principal obstacles to crushing the Afghan rebels.

Why has President Zia's government given sanctuary and assistance to the rebels, and what has this policy implied for its relations with the Soviet Union? To answer these questions, I must first attempt, however briefly, to characterize the present political situation in Pakistan, as I have seen it there in the last two summers.[10]

[9] See, for instance, Carl Bernstein, "Arms for Afghanistan," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), July 18, 1981.

[10] For current Pakistani politics, see *The Economist*, Oct. 31 and Dec. 12, 1981, and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), Apr. 22, 1981. See also the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Oct. 16, 1981, including an interesting interview with President Zia ul-Haq. For Islam in Pakistan, see Nasir Islam, "Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and Bangla Desh," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (Cambridge, England), Vol. 13 (1981), pp. 52–72. This article also contains a useful discussion of Baluch and Pathan nationalism.

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Pakistan, the only state in the world whose sole justification for existence is Islam, has always suffered from endemic ethnic strife. The majority Punjabis (allied with the *muhajirs,* those who fled from India to Pakistan after 1947) are too strong to permit either a confederation or a genuine federation, but they are too weak to crush dissent of the Pathan, Sindhi, and Baluch minorities permanently. In addition, Pakistan has alternated between civilian-democratic and military-authoritarian regimes. Its current military regime is headed by General Zia ul-Haq, who was the chief of staff of the Pakistani army when he overthrew Bhutto in July 1977. Pakistan, like Prussia and Jordan, is an army (indeed an overwhelmingly Punjabi-Pathan army) which possesses a state, and is not likely soon to surrender it.

Army rule, and General Zia personally, remain unpopular. Zia's attempts to help revive Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan have been more divisive than unifying, particularly vis-à-vis the substantial Shi'i minority.

But the unpopularity now seems diminished, even though Pakistani history indicates that sooner or later army rule will again for a time give way to civilian rule. The Soviet menace has somewhat united the Pakistani population. There have been two good monsoons and the healthy flow of remittances from the Gulf. Although the opposition Pakistan People's Party, led by Bhutto's wife, once enjoyed a fair amount of popular support because Zia did not stay Bhutto's execution, it has been discredited by the sojourn in Kabul of Bhutto's two sons and their association with the recent hijacking of a Pakistani airplane, during which a Pakistani diplomat was killed. The Baluch (and Pathan) tribes remain quiet, and Soviet preoccupation with Afghanistan probably explains why there is no evidence of Soviet encouragement or support of any Baluch tribal insurgency. Finally, the Reagan administration has completed what the Carter administration began: a major American arms aid program for Pakistan.

Despite the improvement in Zia's own position and his new closeness to Washington, however, Pakistan's external situation remains precarious (and is thought by most Pakistanis to be even more so than it is) because of the increased Soviet threat. The evidence of this threat is plain to be seen. Presumably at Soviet direction, the Afghan air force (indeed, perhaps with Soviet pilots) regularly overflies Pakistani territory. Border incidents, in which Afghan troops encroach on Pakistani territory, are frequent. Soviet propaganda regularly denounces Pakistan's ties with China and the United States, and above all its alleged aid to the Afghan rebels.

Most Pakistanis also fear a Soviet-encouraged Indian attack on them. (Hence, two thirds of the Pakistani army is stationed on the eastern border facing India.) This fear is the primary explanation for Zia's efforts to reach a détente with India. His efforts have not so far been reciprocated by Indira Gandhi, who has been particularly outraged by the US sale of F-16's to Pakistan. However, India's and China's recent attempt to improve relations with each other, to which Moscow is clearly opposed, will probably have a restraining effect on India vis-à-vis Pakistan. But the Pakistanis' historic fears of India, which has defeated Pakistan thrice and dismembered it once, make it unlikely that Pakistani apprehensions of an Indian attack will decrease.

Although Zia and his able Foreign Minister Agha Shahi have constantly tried to improve their relations with Moscow, they have to date been unsuccessful—despite Pakistani indications that Zia might be prepared to move toward relations with Kabul. Indeed, the visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolay P. Firyubin to Islamabad in August 1981 seems to have had no significant results.[11]

[11] On the Firyubin visit, see *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* Aug. 29, 1981. I was in Islamabad during the visit.

Three Pakistani hijackers of a Pakistan International Airlines aircraft finally debark in Damascus, Syria, on the night of March 14–15, 1981, after gaining release of Pakistani political prisoners in return for release of passengers held hostage for almost two weeks.

—Claude Salhani/Gamma-Liaison.

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Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq, left, meets with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolay Firyubin in Rawalpindi on August 25, 1981. —Wide World.

Nor is this surprising. In my judgment, Moscow intends to continue its attempt to suppress the Afghan rebellion by military force, even if it takes 10 years or more to do so. From a diplomatic standpoint, Moscow hopes to get as many states as possible, and particularly Pakistan, to move toward recognition of Babrak Karmal's embattled regime in Kabul.

After all, Moscow presumably regards the Afghan rebellion as not only supplied (which it reportedly is) but also inspired (which it is not) by the Soviet Union's two principal enemies, China and the United States. Certainly, Moscow is quite aware that it is threatened with encirclement by the new Sino-American-Japanese entente.[12] It intends to break out of this encirclement in advance. It believes that it will do so in two key areas—Afghanistan and Indochina—and it may well hope to do so in Iran as well. Moscow therefore has every incentive to continue to fight in Afghanistan, to support India, and to seek to intimidate Pakistan.

And in the long, bloody, sputtering struggle, the fate of many a Soviet soldier will remind those with a historical bent of Kipling's advice to other soldiers fighting in Afghanistan long ago:

When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains,
An' the women come out to cut up what remains,
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains,
An' go to your Gawd like a soldier.[13]

[12] Moscow has now stated this publicly: "The way the nuclear forces of the United States and other nuclear powers in and out of NATO are deployed, they have in effect, enveloped, even encircled, the Soviet Union and its allies." See *The Threat to Europe*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1981, p. 8.

[13] Rudyard Kipling, "The Young British Soldier."

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Books

Mao's Uncertain Legacy

by Krishna Prakash Gupta

DICK WILSON. *The People's Emperor Mao: A Biography of Mao Tse-tung.* New York, NY, Doubleday, 1980.

ROSS TERRILL. *Mao: A Biography.* New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1980.

JOHN BRYAN STARR. *Continuing the Revolution: The Political Thought of Mao.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

DICK WILSON, Ed. *Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977.

LI JUI. *The Early Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Mao Tse-tung,* trans. by Anthony W. Sariti. New York, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1977.

RAYMOND F. WYLIE. *The Emergence of Maoism.* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1980.

STEVE S. K. CHIN. *The Thought of Mao Tse-tung: Form and Content,* trans. by Alfred H. Y. Lin. Hong Kong, University of Hong Kong, 1979.

TOM KERRY. *The Mao Myth and the Legacy of Stalinism in China.* New York, NY, Pathfinder Press, 1977.

THERE IS NOTHING more demeaning to a protagonist than to split his personality into good and bad components. Such an act of ingratitude can result only from a condescending postmortem that misses the whole in looking at parts. The career of a real protagonist is indivisible, and affirmation or denial of his message must come in a totality. Anything less is nearly always embarrassing, not so much for the protagonist as for his uncertain assessors; for they have to build up a case, often through patently self-negating bits of convoluted logic, that his character was discordant.

The current Chinese assessment of Mao Zedong reveals this embarrassment of an ambivalent generation that has no courage to confront the protagonist frontally. To say that "the Chinese people would never do to Mao what Khrushchev did to Stalin"[1] is not saying much, because the new official caricature of Mao may turn out to be worse than a straight "de-Maoification."

To be sure, the Beijing media still hail Mao as "a great revolutionary," but this greatness is now reduced to the life cycle of an ordinary mortal who becomes smug and conceited with victory, forgets his Marxism and mass line, and shows unmistakable signs of senility as he plunges China into the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. The continued attachment to such a man's "thought" and the habit of invoking it now and then as "a spiritual weapon to guide and advance the Chinese revolution" is indeed pathetic, for it is no longer Mao *qua* Mao that is behind such invocations. Rather, it is a wholly artificial contrivance, "Scientific Mao Zedong Thought," formulated by presumably cleansing Mao's utterances of his "mistakes" and attributed not just to Mao alone.

If Mao's thought is not of his own making and represents only the crystallization of a collective revolutionary experience, as the Chinese now claim, what role can one conceivably assign to Mao the individual in China's revolution and reconstruction? The official answers are once again somewhat embarrassing. With a certain monotonous candor, we are now told that without Mao, the Chinese people would perhaps have groped in the dark much longer. There is, of course, no way to estimate the extent to which Mao's path to revolution in China consti-

[1] This assurance was first publicly given by Deng Xiaoping in his interview with Oriana Fallaci on Aug. 21–23, 1980. The full text of the interview appeared in *The Guardian Weekly* (London), Sept. 22 and 28, 1980. Many of the evaluations of Mao that were subsequently publicized in the Chinese media were apparently picked up from this interview. On not "destalinizing" Mao, see, for example, Zheng Bian, "The Trial Doesn't Involve Chairman Mao," *Beijing Review,* Jan. 5, 1981, p. 4.

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tuted a shortcut. In fact, the fabled Chinese historiographic sensitivities have become so fuzzy today that even the timetable of Mao's achievements has to be circumscribed with shockingly imprecise phraseology—such as "before the 1960's or, rather, before the last few years of the 1950's."[2] This hesitant slicing of Mao's career is done only to suggest, rather impolitely, that "*some* basic principles that Mao put forward in this period, that is before the last few years of the 1950's, are very correct."[3]

Such insipid admiration for a passionate protagonist like Mao is indeed a sad commentary on his achievements. To dismiss the Mao of the Great Leap Forward and thereafter is to dismiss the essence of the Maoist model. The Chinese would not need much historical surgery to see that the Mao they want to uphold today is no different from the Mao they have learned to condemn. In both life cycles, it is the same Mao: self-righteous, opportunistic, and arbitrary, yet fiercely nationalistic. One cannot accept the one and reject the other; only the two together constitute a meaningful evolving whole.

BUT THE CURRENT Beijing mythology of splitting the good and bad Mao has become so pervasive that it has now been almost unconsciously assimilated even by the hard-core professional China watchers. Two recent post-Mao biographies of Mao reviewed here—those by Dick Wilson and Ross Terrill—do for social science what the Chinese have been doing for propaganda. Wilson's great Mao is "propelled by a concern for the dignity and equality of human beings" yet is "vindictive," "unable to work with his colleagues," and "ends up by constructing willy-nilly a dictatorial system"; "champions for the Chinese people a voice of sanity and reasonableness" yet "wastes his energy on a series of futile, debilitating two-line struggles"; "invents for China a completely new system of life, economy and government" yet "fails because the Party would not support him" (pp. xvii, xviii, 490–98). These contradictions inhere not so much between Mao's vision and his work-style as between the biographer's faith and his data.

Terrill's construction of Mao is even more jarring to elementary academic aesthetics. This Mao is so static and unreal that many a time Terrill is himself amazed to see his Mao very un-Maolike. In the 1950's (the officially approved safe period), this happens only occasionally, such as at the time of Mao's handling of the counterrevolutionaries, which does not appear to Terrill very Maoist (p. 214). By the 1970's, however, Terrill's Mao becomes highly unstable, and in Terrill's own words: "it no longer made sense to ask if Mao was these days a Maoist. One day he was; the next day he wasn't" (p. 393).

A more sensitive biographer would perhaps have altered his image of Maoism rather than attribute such silly instability to his subject. Must theoretical constructs of personalities remained fixed in the face of alternative evidence? Obviously, Terrill does not face this dilemma, for his theory of personality growth permits his Mao—whom he first brings up on the world stage as "a giant of this century," endowed with "a doctrine surpassing that of any previous Chinese person," "to be put alongside Confucius and other sages"—to be suddenly transformed into "an amoral gambler," "flashing out of senility or perversity inexplicable signals," "adding confusion and compounding problems," and "using his doctrine only as a rapier of power" (pp. 352, 376, 409, 426–29). But the unkindest cut of all in Terrill's biography is the startling suggestion that "China might have been better off if Mao had died twenty years earlier than he did" (p. 431). If one sees in this judgment some parallels with the current official Beijing verdict on Mao, one should begin to probe for something more than mere coincidence.

Had Mao indeed died 20 years

[2] This imprecise slicing of Mao's career also first emerged in Deng's interview with Fallaci. However, the English text in *The Guardian Weekly* removes the imprecision by stating that Mao had correct ideas "until the Sixties, or to be exact before the later part of the Fifties." See *The Guardian Weekly*, Sept. 22, 1980, p. 17. The Chinese press has, for some reason, restored the imprecision by using the word "rather" in place of "to be exact." See, for instance, Zheng Bian, loc. cit., p. 4.

[3] Zhen Bian, loc. cit., p. 4. Emphasis added.

Reviewers in This Issue

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earlier, one wonders whether it would have been at all possible to see in him, à la Wilson and Terrill, a giant revolutionary on the modern world stage. Although social science objectivity is deceptive, it may be useful to recall that 20 years earlier most China experts portrayed Mao as only an inconsequential accomplice of Soviet global designs. His death would have brought even fewer tears at that point in history. The nostalgia for that point, then, comes from a rereading of history that has been only currently made fashionable in China.

In retrospect, one can even see a subtle process of osmosis through which expert assessments of Mao's legacy seem to have unwittingly picked up many of their cues and insights from planted pieces of official propaganda. There are, of course, always dissenters, but the mainstream approach amply bears out this contention. One need not go too far back to look for evidence. The Mao of Cultural Revolution vintage is a fairly recent example, and books such as John Starr's *Continuing the Revolution* resurrect the historical biases of the late 1960's and early 1970's with great verve and unsuspecting self-confidence. With laborious textual documentation, Starr places the theory of continuing revolution, first put forward by Mao only during the Cultural Revolution, in the historical context of Mao's *entire preceding* life and work. There is here no hint of any possible discontinuity in Mao's career. To Starr, the theory appears to be a logical culmination of Mao's political thinking and actions up to that point (pp. 300–04). This was precisely the official line on Mao at that time.

In fact, the impact of this line on Western experts lasted right through Mao's life, and it began to wear off only some years after his death, when the Chinese themselves decided to unabashedly slice his career into its good and bad parts. Even in 1977, when the cues were coming but were still not confirmed, few could dare to bifurcate Mao's legacy for reasons of historical justice. Not one single contributor to Dick Wilson's *Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History* finds any need to discover the two types of Mao. In most articles, Mao's contributions are viewed in totality, and the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution are invariably treated as indivisibly Maoist in essence and orientation (see, for example, pp. 9, 65–68, 76–77, 88–89, 171, 177, 215–16, 245, 262, 296–97, 304–05). Edward Friedman's paper in this volume goes to the extent of saying that "the innovations of Mao which are usually summed up in the term 'Maoism' mostly begin in the early 1960's" and "had Mao died at that point, all evaluations of his contribution would have been affected by the idea that his vision had failed, and his peers would most likely have reversed his course" (p. 306).

QUITE CLEARLY, it is not an easy task to decide when Mao should have died. What were once applauded as the most precious ingredients of his message are today being reviled as un-Marxist bits of a senile autocrat. It is tragic to see how many responsible social scientists have internalized this purely propagandistic volte-face. Not many evidently have the courage to stand up and be counted as more Maoist than Mao's own native "followers." When the recent official Chinese "Resolution on Questions in Party History since 1949" itself sternly states that all of Mao's principal theses for initiating and sustaining the Cultural Revolution "conformed neither to Marxism-Leninism nor to Chinese reality,"[4] few outsiders any more dare to defend Mao's alternative model of development. Slowly but surely, this part of Mao's legacy will wither away under the present Chinese dispensation. What would be left would be a Mao whose revolutionary credentials, notwithstanding the many myths that are now being dusted and wrapped afresh around the pre-1956 Mao, would not go beyond the successful opportunism of a fiercely nationalistic Chinese, accidentally turned Communist hero.

Once the debunking begins, there are many questions that are bound to be asked inside and outside China about this pre-1956 Mao. Some evidence suggests that such questioning has already occurred in China, but the details are still missing.[5]

The point to ponder is whether a perverse adult who would be ready to forsake his vision and ideology for reasons of crude self-aggrandizement could have had a genuinely revolutionary adolescence and youth. Or should the stories of his concern and commitment then also be treated only as make-believe half-truths? In biology, freaks appear with regularity, but with new evidence on Mao's deformation in adulthood, the need for a second look at some of the popular myths of his revolutionary genesis would increasingly become self-evident.

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[4] This resolution was adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on June 27, 1981. For the full text, see *Beijing Review*, July 6, 1981, pp. 10–39. For a fuller indictment of the Cultural Revolution, see especially pp. 20–26.

[5] Several articles appeared in the Chinese press in the middle of 1981 which seemed to be defending Mao and the CCP against the charges of causing the civil war and destroying national unity. See, for example, *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), July 4, 1981, and *Wenhuibao* (Shanghai), July 22, 1981. A brief review of these two articles may be found in *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), Aug. 28, 1981.

Deng has already called Jiang Qing "a mistake" of Mao, and it may not be too far-fetched to suggest that many in China might be tempted to reopen the whole question of Mao's marriage to her. Mao's flirtation with the Kuomintang and the Hunan independence movement would also inevitably come up for review, and this would create new strains in keeping up an idealized image of the pre-1956 Mao.

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Yet Mao's biographers still cling to many such stories, and the myth of Mao's rebellious childhood remains a favorite staple. It is a Mao who shares his lunch with a deprived schoolmate, protests against his teacher's formalized instructions, sells his family's pig and donates the proceeds to a beggar, shows a determined tenacity to read books of his own choice, approves a poor peasant's burgling of his own house, and threatens to jump into a pond only because he is scorned in the presence of some family guests (Wilson, pp. 9–12; Terrill, pp. 9–12). These are all marks of a concerned citizen in the making.

This same Mao, however, does not express a word in protest when his father marries him to a girl six years his senior. Only some years later would Mao write eloquent articles against arranged marriages. Now he goes through his own wedding in blissful silence. His faithful biographers assure us that Mao never "laid a finger on her" (Terrill, p. 12) and she "eventually married someone else" (Wilson, p. 12). Whether such contrived compensations indeed exonerate Mao is not the issue. The question is why a concerned and rebellious adolescent should consent to go through the ceremony at all.

It is not a trivial question, because Mao's later alliances and commitments tend to show a similar disdain for propriety and consistency. Books like Li Jui's do manage to provide us a homogenized version of Mao's early revolutionary activities, but they do so, as Stuart Schram has amply documented in this case, by glossing over many awkward problems in the career of young Mao (see Schram's "Introduction" in Li Jui, pp. xi–xii, xx–xxi, xxviii–xxix, xxxiv–xxxv, xlii). His flirtations with the Kuomintang (KMT) Propaganda Department and the Autonomous Hunan Movement are the two best known. Here again, the more disturbing questions have yet to be asked.

At some point, someone is going to reopen the whole matter of Mao's attachment to Marxism-Leninism. The issue then will not be the 1919 article by Mao that Li Jui quotes to show how Mao already integrated a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution (which, as Schram has established, he did not as yet do, see pp. xxviii, 111–15). Rather, it will be why Mao, who only two years earlier had recommended physical education for China's salvation and even now rated Pëtr Kropotkin's ethic of social harmony higher than the violence of Marxist struggle, *suddenly,* in a period of a few months, switched to applauding the Soviet Union, setting up societies and bookstores to propagate Marxism, and working to organize teams to visit Russia for the study of the Russian revolution. Mao's own explanation, that he read a couple of books on Marxism at this time and was enlightened, is a bit thin to provide any firm clues to his conversion.

There are still no hard data about this whole process of Chinese intellectual "attraction" to Marxism in the early 1920's, but if the Indian evidence of that time has any parallels, one might suspect that such sudden and massive Chinese organizational efforts as the publication of many Marxist journals, distribution of vast amounts of Marxist propaganda literature, and the setting up of a string of local-level Marxist study societies concealed many more variables than the mere appeal of an alien ideology. No doubt Mao was caught up in a stream of intellectual consciousness of which he was only a minor part at this time.

It must be said to Mao's credit that, unlike many others of his generation, he perhaps never moved beyond a crudely utilitarian approach to his own "convictions." How, then, could he negotiate with his colleagues to secure the label of the great Chinese revolutionary who sinified Marxism-Leninism? The answer to this comes in part from Raymond Wylie's *The Emergence of Maoism,* but here again the constraints of social science prevent Wylie from probing beneath the conventional wisdom.

Wylie, like others before him, argues that Mao succeeded because he produced a distinctive Chinese Communist ideology which held immense appeal to party intellectuals, which established China's cultural independence from the West (including the Soviet Union), and which overshadowed the ideological alternative offered by the KMT (pp. 282–83). Such an argument is evidently predicated on Mao's superior insight into the Chinese situation and his capacity to apply the universal categories of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of the Chinese revolution. On both these counts, however, the evidence merits a fresh scrutiny.

Mao's turning to the peasantry is often cited in this context as his greatest Marxist-Leninist innovation, but the chronology of facts on this question still leaves the issue somewhat hazy. Mao first worked among the Hunan peasants in the autumn of 1924. He then went to work for the Kuomintang Propaganda Department, hardly a place to enrich his Marxism. In February 1926, he explicitly upheld the leading role of the urban proletariat, yet in about six months he switched over to stress the preeminent revolutionary potential of the peasantry. In 1928, he argued once more, as Zhou Enlai's recently released writings reveal, in favor of the centrality of Communist work in the cities, but he reversed this position

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again in less than a year's time.[6]

There are further doubts whether such intellectual acrobatics on Mao's part were accompanied by any serious theoretical reappraisal of the nature of Marxism-Leninism and its particularization in China. In 1939, Mao was ready, in complete disregard of the elementary canons of proletarian internationalism, to accept aid from the United States; in 1940, he was prepared, if one accepts Wang Ming's testimony, to collaborate with Japan, then China's hated aggressor; and in 1944, he was ready to accept American intervention and, unlike Chiang Kai-shek, even stomach the American proposal to place a US general in command of the entire Chinese war effort.[7]

It is perhaps not too difficult to justify each of these moves as transitional tactics in some wider Marxist-Leninist strategy, but the final evidence strongly suggests another possibility. After all, the same Mao who had joined the Kuomintang publicity apparatus when his Communist comrades were languishing in Canton jails later accepted the desirability of a coalition government and nearly a decade after the Communist takeover still pleaded for a synthesis of Russia's revolution with America's practical spirit. All this was a rather bizarre way of sinifying Marxism-Leninism.

SUCH AN ideological assessment of Mao is hardly new. Many a time before, Mao has been subjected to evaluations from the fixed theoretical standpoints of different kinds of Marxism. For example, true believers like Steve S.K. Chin have found in him a synthesis of Chinese national forms and Marxist-Leninist content, while critics like Tom Kerry have accused him of forsaking the genuine Marxist-Leninist legacy. Such praise or blame almost always exposes the evaluator's bias; it does little to describe, much less explain, Mao's thought on Mao's own terms.

Chin's use of the hopelessly dated analogy of the Beijing revolutionary opera to explicate Mao Thought—national in form but Marxist-Leninist in content (pp. 1, 14–16, 114–20, 142)—totally misses Mao's continuous experimentation with ideas, and it is possible to argue, as the Chinese themselves are doing today, that Mao was on many occasions using a Marxist form only to push some very un-Marxist contents. Needless to add, this kind of argument merely replaces one kind of bias with another.

In such scenarios, the suggested solutions—recipes of what Mao should really have done—are sometimes worse than the original diagnoses. Kerry's Trotskyite suggestions are a case in point. His recommended course of action would have seen Mao trying to win over the Japanese occupation army morally through efforts to arouse their sympathies, keeping his faith in the efficacy of the urban proletariat simply because that could possibly have prevented Chiang from running away to Taiwan, and turning over his country to the USSR after 1949 to create one grand federal political entity under the auspices of a single socialist commonwealth (pp. 27, 33, 118). At this point, one can only say, "thank god, Mao was not a Trotskyite."

But even if one grants to each his own prejudice, the question of Mao's legacy still remains unresolved. What, after all, are Mao's own terms for looking at him and for assessing whether he is at all relevant to China today?

The claim to sinification of Marxism-Leninism is hardly an improvement on Hong Xiuquan's mid-19th century delusion that he was the younger brother of Jesus Christ. Mao's place in history cannot ultimately rest on the adaptation of alien ideology, on the working out of a synthesis which he tried to implement in vain. His pre-1949 struggles can in no way be considered crucial breakthroughs of great theoretical significance in the corpus of orthodox Communist literature. Whether his doctrinal formulations of this period are an enrichment of Marxism-Leninism or its distortion depends upon the bias of the analyst. That he fought many a military battle and won is common knowledge, but

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[6] For a conventional analysis of Mao's turning to the peasantry as the mainstay of China's revolution, see Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, New York, NY, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, pp. 167–92. See also his "Mao Zedong and the Role of the Various Classes in the Chinese Revolution, 1923–1927," in *The Polity and Economy of China* (The Late Professor Yuji Muramatsu Commemoration Volume), Tokyo, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1975, pp. 227–39.

Schram has argued that Mao turned decisively to the Chinese peasantry with his September 1926 article entitled "The National Revolution and the Peasant Movement." This dating, however, needs to be reviewed in the light of Zhou Enlai's testimony. Zhou shows that Mao's thinking on this issue went through several phases, and that even as late as the Sixth National Congress in 1928, Mao "had not arrived at the idea of focusing our work on the rural areas." See *Zhou Enlai Xuanji* (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai), Vol. 1, Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1981, p. 179.

The fact that Zhou's article has inspired several other studies of Mao's role in making the peasantry the focus of China's revolution suggests that the current Chinese leadership is willing to demythify the earlier claims as to Mao's original enrichment of Marxism-Leninism on this question. Most of these studies imply that Mao's turning to the peasantry was based on actual situational requirements, rather than on any innovative breakthrough. See, for instance, Teng Wensheng and Jian Chunfeng, "Realistically Sum Up Historical Experiences—Reading Comrade Zhou Enlai's 'A Study of the Party's Sixth National Congress,'" *Hongqi* (Beijing), No. 2, Jan. 16, 1981, pp. 16–21, as translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report* (Arlington, VA), No. 77697, Mar. 30, 1981, pp. 22–30.
See also Shi Zongquan and Yang Zenghe, "Zhou Enlai on Mao Zedong Thought," *Beijing Review*, Mar. 2, 1981, pp. 8–11.

[7] On Mao's willingness to accept aid from the United States in 1939, see *Mao Zedongji* (Collected Works of Mao Zedong), ed. Takeuchi Minoru, Tokyo, Hokubosha, 1970–72, Vol. VII, pp. 15–16. Wang Ming's memoirs, *Polveka KPK i predatel'stvo Mao Tsze-duna* (Half a Century of the CCP and the Treachery of Mao Zedong), were published in Russian in 1975; the relevant extract is translated by Wilson (p. 221) in his biography of Mao, reviewed here. On Mao's invitation to American intervention in 1944, see Joseph W. Esherick, Ed., *Lost Chance in China: The World War II Dispatches of John S. Service*, New York, NY, Random House, 1974, pp. 295–307.

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whether China would have groped in the dark a little longer without him or would have undergone a social transformation without so much violence and hatred are questions that even history may never answer.

Yet there is no way in which one can wish away Mao's role in the making of modern China. At each point, and more so in periods of acute personal letdown, he withdraws for a moment but returns with a majestic sweep. All through, he revels in striking back at his opponents with a shocking tenacity, and succeeds in the end in wresting top honors from his somewhat reluctant colleagues.

There is no way in which social science methods can be used to unravel the mysteries of this man's success. Nor is there any means of knowing why a confirmed adversary like Wang Ming, who was never really enamored of Mao's leadership qualities, should have apparently surrendered to Mao in 1940 with an abject slogan like "Learn from Mao Zedong," or why a self-confident member of the party elite like Liu Shaoqi, who saw no great merits in Mao's writings by 1941, should have turned around in a few years' time and hailed Mao as the greatest theoretician and scientist in Chinese history. Was it Mao's charisma, changes of heart on the part of his adversaries, or dirty political deals? Or was someone from somewhere else pulling some strings?

In the intriguing world of Chinese politics, one does not know whether to read between the lines or beneath them. Mao's greatest hour of glory, the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1945, which promoted his thought as "the guiding principle in the Party's *entire* work,"[8] appears in retrospect as the weakest link in Mao's final ascent to power. There is no way of determining, but one suspects that he was really "kicked upstairs" and began to be treated as a "dead ancestor" right after this congress. As China was coming under Communist control and even as he was being applauded as the supreme architect of this development, he remained a tense witness to China's slow degeneration into a bourgeois-revisionist state. An unfettered intellectual addicted to a lawless approach to Marxism, he was to see his own texts mutilated into the uncomfortable straitjacket of an alien orthodoxy. A fighter to the core, having challenged his would-be Russian masters and their native disciples many a time before, he was to mutely deny himself the little luxury of eating fish and soup together only because of some stray Soviet newspaper or journal article.

This is the pre-1956 Mao upheld in China's press today. China's lavish praise of this Mao for his many brilliant victories still does not ring bells of credibility, for there is something vitally missing in this half-truth. Mao was in his true element only when he was fighting to transform *his* vision into Chinese reality. In post-1949 China, he did so at a time and with an intent that stand discredited today, but it is not too difficult to see behind Mao's many struggles against the "returned students" before 1949 the same passion, the same obstinacy, and the same recklessness that he displayed in his struggles against his entrenched associates thereafter.

Structurally, there is no difference in these two Maos. As a protagonist, he stands almost alone in each struggle, but "crowds" can be discerned in his shadow. The Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution symbolize a search for a new life-style and an alternative developmental model, and the anarchy and the absurdity that such a search must entail. Some may see madness; others may see courage in such experiments. But they come in a package deal that cannot be negotiated.

[8] The phrase is from the General Program of the Constitution of the CCP, adopted by the Seventh National Congress in 1945. Emphasis added. It was also repeatedly employed in the report delivered by Liu Shaoqi to this congress. See *Collected Works of Liu Shao-chi, 1945–1957*, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1969, pp. 10, 26, 96.

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Women and Revolution: China and Vietnam

by Jayne Werner

ELISABETH CROLL. *Women in Rural Development: People's Republic of China.* Geneva, International Labor Organization, 1979.

K. H. FAN and K. T. FAN. *From the Other Side of the River.* New York, NY, Doubleday, 1975.

PHILIP C. HUANG, Ed. *Chinese Communism and Rural Society, 1927–34.* Berkeley, CA, Center for Chinese Studies, 1978.

NGUYEN THI DINH. *No Other Road to Take.* Trans. by Mai Elliott. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper No. 102, 1974.

MAI THI TU and LE THI NAM TUYET. *Women in Vietnam.* Hanoi, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978.

KATHLEEN GOUGH. *Ten Times More Beautiful.* New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1978.

IT IS APPARENT that despite arguments put forward by Frederick Engels and Karl Marx, full emancipation of women has not automatically ensued from socialist revolution. Nor, even, has the goal of women's equality necessarily been a priority objective of socialist movements. This seems to be as true for revolutions in China and Vietnam as for the Soviet precursor.

Marx saw women in bourgeois society as serving the function of commodity exchange, as mere instruments of production. Women in the bourgeois family were defined by their roles as daughter, wife, and mother. Their exploitation, as that of working-class women, stemmed from the class basis of society. Once that basis was removed, female oppression would come to an end. Unlike Marx, Engels did recognize the existence of a sexual division of labor within the family. But he assumed that the family—the basis of women's oppression—would disintegrate when capitalism disappeared.[1]

Socialist movements on the road to power have sought to mobilize women on the basis of these arguments. Although in different cultural and religious settings "women's equality" may have meant different things to different people, the term has generally, and minimally, implied improvement of women's status vis-à-vis men. But other goals have invariably taken precedence over women's liberation, whatever meaning it may have assumed, and women's emancipation has often been used to further other goals. Improvement of women's condition has rarely been seen as an end in itself. In Soviet Central Asia, for instance, the Bolsheviks mobilized women in order to weaken the patriarchal authority of the Muslim family and to consolidate Communist Party control over the region.[2] In China before 1949, the Communists mobilized women to advance the anti-Japan struggle and the revolution against Chiang Kai-shek—to break the power of the landlords, not to bring women's liberation as such.[3] In Vietnam, mobilization of women has occurred at times of peak war mobilization and has tended to decline during periods of less intense crisis.[4] Of these three socialist revolutions, the Chinese seems to have placed the greatest emphasis on women's emancipation for its own sake, possibly because of the strong egalitarian features of Maoism. The Soviets and the Vietnamese, while holding up the banner of women's emancipation, appear not to have displayed intense concern about the woman question in the absence of war, party-building, or social pressures.

One reason for the less than salient role of the women's movement in each of these revolutions has been the reluctance of socialist

[1] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Woman Question,* New York, NY, International Publishers, 1951.

[2] Gregory J. Massell, *The Surrogate Proletariat, Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919–1929,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1974.

[3] Delia Davin, *Woman-Work, Women and the Party in Revolutionary China,* London, Oxford University Press, 1976, pp. 138–40.

[4] Jayne Werner, "Women, Socialism, and the Economy of War-Time North Vietnam, 1960–75," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Summer/Autumn 1981.

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theorists and revolutionaries to acknowledge that a sexual division of labor exists in society, or that it is as fundamental a division as the division by class. Yet increasing evidence suggests that the sexual division of labor can be treated as an "independent variable," that it has "non-class" origins and probably differs with the national culture. Moreover, the sexual division of labor can probably survive into the socialist period and indeed even up until the "full flowering of communism." If there exist specific cultural features which complement the system of sex roles in particular societies, this division of labor might be a unique "national" characteristic which persists even in socialist societies.

Existence of a sexual division of labor with cultural expressions that trace their roots to the origins of society could go far toward explaining the difficulty that socialist societies have experienced in achieving full women's equality. The Chinese, in effect, acknowledged the independent impact of culture on society when during the Cultural Revolution, they attempted to promote women's equality and advance the women's movement by *ideological* means. Similarly, the "Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius" campaign of 1973–74, which was in part focused on male-female relations, attempted to change the continuing nonequal character of these relationships by encouraging the adoption of new attitudes.[5]

A GROWING literature on the women's movement in China and in Vietnam provides some insight into the factors that impede the achievement of full social equality by women in socialist societies. While such studies have by and large taken the form of trip reports, short analytic pieces, or translated vignettes from the personal histories of women who participated in the respective revolutions, those on China in particular are becoming broader and more analytic. Although this expanding literature is still groping for a frame of reference and adequate comparative perspective, three issues of historical and comparative interest have emerged: (1) the relationship between the women's movement and the Communist party, (2) the question of how sex roles change during revolutionary struggle, and (3) the relationship between women's equality and the process of socialist development.

Each of the works reviewed here sheds some light on one or more of these issues. Elisabeth Croll's *Women in Rural Development: People's Republic of China* is an important analysis of rural women and socialist development in China. It establishes a perspective that is relevant to the Vietnamese case, and indeed to nonsocialist societies as well. K. H. Fan and K. T. Fan's *From the Other Side of the River* consists of translations of writings by Chinese women themselves on the impact of socialism on their life experiences. Kathy Walker's contribution to the volume edited by Philip C. Huang discusses the women's movement in relation to early Communist party-organizing in rural China. For Vietnam, we have Mai Elliott's translation of the poignant and detailed memoirs of Mme. Nguyen Thi Dinh, the former Deputy Commander of the People's Liberation Army in southern Vietnam. *Women in Vietnam* is a recent, abridged English translation of an earlier work by a North Vietnamese historian, Le Thi Nham Tuyet. It is the most comprehensive study on women published to date by Hanoi.[6] Finally, Kathleen Gough's *Ten Times More Beautiful* is an account of a North American's personal encounter with the Vietnamese women's movement during a trip to socialist Vietnam.

THE WALKER article shows how the women's movement influenced the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) early in its history, playing a significant role in the development of base areas of the Provisional Soviet Government formed in South China in 1931. Women's work within and outside the party was stressed because the CCP needed the support of the peasantry in the base areas as the party experimented with a new rural strategy. Women were involved in production and in land reform. They were also encouraged to participate in local government (and did so in large numbers). The concrete policies thus developed not only contributed to raising the status of women but also laid down an outline for women's liberation to be carried forward in the future. Of course, the women's programs were not the only ones developed by the CCP, nor was the women's issue given top priority. Nevertheless, the women's movement appears to have made an important contribution to the early fortunes of the CCP.

In the Vietnamese case, a similar promotion of the women's movement had to wait until the early 1950's, during the land reform. In fact, during the 1930's the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP—the predecessor of the Vietnam Communist Party) ignored mass work among women. Although there was a Women's Union, women were not permitted to join "mass" organizations (*hoi quan chung*).[7] Le Thi Nham Tuyet alludes to the neglect of

[5] Croll, p. 39.

[6] Le Thi Nham Tuyet's original volume was *Phu Nu Viet Nam Qua Cac Thoi Dai* (Women in Vietnam Throughout History), Hanoi, Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1973.

[7] Tran Van Giau, "The Ebbing and Recovery of the Revolutionary Movement: 1932–1935," *Hoc Tap* (Hanoi), November-December 1958, p. 69.

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women's work during the peasant uprisings of the early 1930's (p. 115). During the wars against Japan, France, and the US, however, the mobilization of women in Vietnam followed more closely the experience of the Chinese.

THE SECOND ISSUE of concern here is the relationship between women and revolution. The revolutionary situation, as illustrated by Mme. Nguyen Thi Dinh's memoirs, suspends in time, as it were, societal expectations about sex roles, and therefore modifies the sex roles themselves. Participation in national liberation wars frees women from traditional norms and duties and allows them to perform tasks which would be considered "improper" in other times. In revolutions, women are allowed, and even encouraged, to assume roles outside family circles, with social approval. From this experience they gain both social prestige and new-found personal confidence. They perform various political, paramilitary, and military functions—participating in mass organizations, planning demonstrations, propagandizing among enemy soldiers, serving as party cadres, performing liaison duties and carrying arms, and serving as army combatants. Not only did Nguyen Thi Dinh and other party and nonparty women carry out missions that women were thought incapable of performing, they even often climbed to positions of high responsibility.

The importance of the contribution of women's mobilization to the success of the revolutionary struggle tended to convert temporary "suspension" into permanent modification of cultural values. When "improper" behavior—such as attending midnight meetings or going on long political organizing trips with male cadres—became essential to the revolution, "respectability" was redefined, and consciousness about women's roles and capabilities changed in the minds of young and old alike. The liberation struggle, with its focus on oppression by the class enemy, also has tended to bring new sensitivity to the traditional oppression of women.

A THIRD MATTER relates to the position of women once the revolutionary regime turns to the "building of socialism." Does socialist development advance women's equality, or does the process discriminate against women? The development experience of the Soviet Union has shown that full equality for women does not necessarily accompany the process of socialist industrialization. By contrast, China's post-1949 experience at least seemed to suggest that through conscious public policy, women's liberation could be achieved *during* rather than *after* socialist development and that policy might be a more important determinant of women's position than the level of socialist development per se.[8]

Certainly, the development of socialism in China offered women great opportunities for personal transformation, as the vignettes in *From the Other Side of the River* attest. Yet, there is growing evidence that socialist development and women's equality have not advanced at equal pace in China either. Continuing patterns of differentiation of roles by sex can be observed, and it may be that occupational differences by sex in China will come to mirror certain aspects of those in the Soviet Union.

Development specialist Croll, in the study reviewed here, provides considerable information about social, economic, ideological, and organizational obstacles to the full achievement of equality for women in China. For example, the "double burden" of full-time work by women at a place of employment and their performance of a "second shift" of unpaid domestic labor at home—well known in the socialist societies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—appears to exist in China as well. In China, the impact of the "second shift" is somewhat ameliorated by existence of the extended family. As Croll points out, were it not for the child care performed by grandmothers, it would be difficult for Chinese women to participate in collective labor in large numbers. In fact, where there are not grandmothers, women tend to stay at home and raise the children themselves.[9]

As development has proceeded and the division of labor has expanded in China, men have tended to fill nonagricultural jobs, while women have stayed behind in agriculture (Croll, *Women in Rural Development,* p. 27). This process, called the "feminization of agriculture," has been noted in Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania;[10] as we shall see below, it has occurred in Vietnam as well, during times of war mobilization.

Where both men and women engage in agricultural work in China, women have been assigned "lighter" work (which is awarded fewer work points), and the men, "heavier" work. While this may be designed in part to protect women, the unquestionable result has been inferior earnings for women.

The structure of the Chinese rural household and the relationship of

[8] See, for example, Elisabeth Croll's earlier work, *Feminism and Socialism in China,* London, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, and New York, NY, Schocken, 1980.

[9] In rural communes, half or more of preschool children are at home with their grandmothers (Croll, *Women in Rural Development,* p. 33).

[10] Celia T. Castillo, "The Changing Role of Women in Rural Societies: A Summary of Trends and Issues," Seminar Report No. 12, New York, NY, Agricultural Development Council, February 1977.

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the household to production have also presented obstacles to the full emancipation of women. Although women received title to land during the land reform and in the commune draw pay individually for their collective labor (rather than see it go to the head of the household), they still do not have full economic independence. The household unit continues to organize labor allocation and to dispense income to its members. Although women are valued for their contribution to the household budget, the male head of the household tends to dominate the "family" decision-making. Domestic labor, which helps maintain the household unit, is performed almost exclusively by women and is unpaid. Furthermore, because of the time demands of such domestic responsibilities, women members of the household unit end up performing less remunerative jobs in the collective sector.

Since the more workers the family can supply, the greater the family's resources, the goal of the family (and, hence, of the woman) is to produce a large number of workers. Sons are particularly valued, for they are able to make more work points and also because they will stay in the family and upon marriage provide additional workers, their wives and their children. Under the persisting marriage rules of village exogamy and patrilocal residence, daughters leave the family and are thus not as much of an economic asset.[11] Hence, Chinese rural families still express preferences for early marriage, for sons, and for marriage gifts for daughters-in-law. As a result, women have found their participation in the economic and political affairs of the village circumscribed. Communes have made their plans for training, education, and work programs on the assumption that girls will leave for another commune upon marriage; hence, girls have not received the same attention and benefits from the commune as boys have.

In sum, the obstacles to full equality for women in China appear to stem from the sexual division of labor in society, the cultural expressions of this division, and the household structure.

ALTHOUGH the data now available on Vietnam hardly compare with those on China in the Croll study, it is clear that the development process in Vietnam lags considerably behind that in China. It appears that many of the same problems with regard to women are present in Vietnam. Socialism has given women in Vietnam unparalleled opportunities for work outside the home, increased self-confidence, and increased public participation, but women's equality has not yet been fully achieved.

Kathleen Gough's report demonstrates the remarkable advances that women have made in Vietnam, but the author notes some familiar patterns as well.[12] There is a preference for large families, and for boys over girls. The birthrate has yet to decline to a level that permits women to pursue effective work careers. Child care is often assumed by grandmothers in households where mothers work, and the problem of mother-in-law domination of young wives persists. There is a pronounced sexual division of labor within the household, with minimal male domestic responsibilities. Although Gough claims otherwise (p. 87), there appear to be different pay scales for men and women in agricultural work, as in China.[13] Moreover, the feminization of agricultural work was accelerated in Vietnam in 1965–73 during the war with the United States, to the point that 60 percent or more of agriculture became the responsibility of women. The Vietnam Communist Party's line is that there are women's activities and men's activities and that women are responsible for the home and the family. Women form the majority of workers in light industry, trade, medical work, and education, whereas men predominate in heavy industry, transport, mining, and communications. This pattern is also found in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

IS THE DOUBLE BURDEN of women in the developed socialist countries of the USSR and Eastern Europe, then, being re-created in China and Vietnam? The question is important, for the early stages of socialist development may lay the groundwork for future social patterns.

Socialist transformation undoubtedly creates conditions conducive to the liberation of women. Women in China and Vietnam have experienced revolutionary changes in their marital conditions, their status within the family, and their ability to earn their own income. They have achieved legal and political rights. However, before women can engage fully in collective labor, these underdeveloped socialist countries must probably achieve in-

[11] Norma Diamond, "Collectivization, kinship and the status of women in rural China," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (Claremont, MA), January-March 1975, pp. 25–33.

[12] It should be noted that the Gough study is not primarily meant to be a comparative and historical analysis of the women's movement in Vietnam as such, but rather is a North American's search for understanding of the impact of US military actions on Vietnam.

[13] Articles in Vietnamese periodicals have mentioned this problem. See, for instance, an article by Dang Duc Cuong, a district party secretary in Ha Tay Province, "Concentrate on Training Female Labor," *Phu Nu Viet Nam* (Hanoi), Nov. 1, 1968, pointing out the problem of unequal pay scales for men and women engaged in agriculture in the district.

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dustrialization, in order to be able to provide comprehensive child-care facilities, medical care, and household conveniences.[14]

Yet, even the process of socialist development—itself not necessarily prejudicial to women's equality—may nonetheless bring about a sexual division of labor. To be sure, public policy may provide a means of correcting imbalances and inequalities incurred during industrial and agricultural transformation, and if the socialist state intervenes and consciously pursues the equal participation of men and women in the development process, women's concerns need not necessarily be neglected. At present, however, both China and Vietnam are pursuing an erratic pattern of state intervention in this regard.

[14] In Vietnam, only a minority of families appear to have access to child-care facilities. Even in the mid-1970's in the largest textile mill in the North, where women constituted 80 percent of the labor force, most of the women had to arrange for child care at home because of poor facilities at the factory. Although there were purportedly 13,500 child-care centers in the North in the 1960's, only a few model provinces had such facilities in up to 50 percent of their agricultural cooperatives. See "Promote the Functional Role of the Women's Association in the Management of Child-Care Houses," *Phu Nu Viet Nam*, June 16, 1970.

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Social Inequality in the USSR

by Basile Kerblay

ALASTAIR McAULEY. *Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union: Poverty, Living Standards, and Inequality.* Madison, WI, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979.

VINOD MEHTA. *Soviet Economic Policy: Income Differentials in USSR.* New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1977.

WALTER D. CONNOR. *Socialism, Politics, and Equality: Hierarchy and Change in Eastern Europe and the USSR.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1979.

MURRAY YANOWITCH. *Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union: Six Studies.* White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1977.

JERRY G. PANKHURST and MICHAEL PAUL SACKS, Eds. *Contemporary Soviet Society: Sociological Perspectives.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1980.

WE ALL consider ourselves different from our fellow men yet continuously compare ourselves with, measure ourselves against, them. Any inequality seems an injustice. According to the socialist school of thought, inequality is economic in origin. But has state appropriation of the means of production in the USSR lessened inequality there? This is a question raised in all the works reviewed here. Although the approach varies from author to author, the measured tone of the various analyses reflects a common concern: to try to understand the facts before passing judgment on them. For this reason, they rely heavily on the latest publications by Soviet sociologists and economists, in order (particularly in the books by Walter Connor and Murray Yanowitch) to familiarize the reader with the different models of social stratification proposed by researchers in the Communist countries.

As a first pass at the problem, we have Alastair McAuley and Vinod Mehta, who set out to measure quantifiable inequalities using official data. Their works examine somewhat different periods from different comparative perspectives. Mehta looks at the half century between 1922 and 1970 and draws his comparisons to India. This leads him to more favorable estimates than those of McAuley, who concentrates on recent decades and uses the developed industrial countries as his reference model. McAuley's research is more rigorous, because it goes beyond statistics on wages in various sectors and attempts to determine disposable income per capita, taking into account payments in kind, welfare transfers, and the number of wage earners and dependent children per family. He also tries to calculate regional variations in living standards in relation to the demographic situation and the proportional share of the rural population in the total population of each republic. He finds that

By international standards regional inequality—measured by the coefficient of variation in personal consumption—in the USSR is quite modest: it is almost twice that found in such sparsely populated developed countries as Australia or New Zealand but only two thirds of that found in the USA and approximately half of that found in Japan or France. (p. 115)

This does not mean that life is pleasant at the lower end of the scale. Starting from what he calls the "minimum material satisfaction budget," which from Soviet calculations was 51.40 rubles a month per capita in 1967, McAuley concludes that in the same year, per capita monthly earnings were below this poverty threshold in Belorussia, Azerbaydzhan, and the Central Asian republics. In 1967, not only some 12 million kolkhozniks but also 32 percent of urban families (two thirds of urban families with only a single wage earner) earned less than 50 rubles a month per capita. Of course, this estimate is based on a "normative budget," which, McAuley emphasizes, is relative over time (pp. 17–18, 77, 306).

At the other end of the scale are the industrial managers and intellectuals. In 1964 in the mechanical engineering industries, the salary of

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the director of the largest firm was five times as great as the base pay for a worker (67 rubles), while a physician could earn a maximum of 4.25 times the minimum wage (40 rubles). Although, as McAuley notes, "nothing is published on salaries of the central bureaucracy," he manages to offer a distribution of per capita income for the Soviet population by decile for 1967 and 1968. This yielded a decile coefficient (the ratio of per capita earnings of the top 10 percent to those of the lowest 10 percent) of 3.14–3.21, which, McAuley points out, "is a moderately unequal distribution of income . . . inequality in the USSR is less than in the UK and substantially less than in the USA" (p. 66).

Nonetheless, this wage range does not take into account "the standard of living of the Soviet elite—250,000 persons—entitled to extensive fringe benefits . . . ([which] include chauffeur-driven automobiles, dachas, priority in the purchase of performance tickets, the right to buy in closed retail establishments scarce high-quality goods at reportedly favorable prices) impossible to measure in money terms" (p. 67). Indeed, almost one third of the sales in the USSR retail business in 1960 were in stores reserved for special customers.[1] I might add that besides these legal privileges—which exist, if not in the same forms, in other countries as well—there is in the USSR a sphere of illegal inequalities created by the "second economy." In Moscow, it is the butchers and persons responsible for allocating apartments who seem to be the wealthiest, although their wages are very modest. (These nouveaux riches reveal themselves through their expenditures rather than through their nominal incomes.)

McAuley and Mehta agree that over the several decades since the death of Iosif Stalin, inequalities in the USSR have tended to diminish. Between 1956 and 1970, average income grew by 66 percent, whereas incomes in the first (lowest) decile increased by 135 percent, thanks to increases in base pay, particularly for kolkhozniks. (This increase in base pay, however, was not enough to eliminate pockets of poverty. It proved necessary to institute family allowances for households lacking minimum resources and to increase retirement pensions.) McAuley's analysis notes that these improvements were due not only to the government's social policy but also to market forces. Labor shortages have brought competition among firms in the labor market, to the benefit of the workers.

On the other hand, the managers have taken advantage of the rights granted them in 1965 to recover lost ground with respect to wages, by increasing their own bonuses. Between 1961 and 1970, when the base pay of engineering and technical workers increased by only 9 percent, bonuses in this category increased by 198 percent (p. 239)! Thus, the policy of reducing inequalities cannot be assessed accurately without taking account of the capacities of various social forces to circumvent it.

TO COMPREHEND the real nature of inequality in the Soviet Union, however, one must delve beneath the first, i.e., the purely economic, layer of this "matrëshka." The Soviet and East European sociologists whom Connor and Yanowitch discuss all turn essentially to production structures and the division of labor in explaining current differences in income levels and elaborating upon official classifications of social groups. But in so doing, they ignore such determining factors as privilege and power.

Indeed, differences in income levels alone do not necessarily mean that social stratification exists. It is necessary (1) that these economic inequalities be combined with other kinds of inequalities, and (2) that an individual from a given level have fewer opportunities during his career than do persons from other strata to become a member of a higher stratum. If there is complete social mobility, privileges may be justified as incentives to reward merit.

We have already seen some indication of the exercise of privilege and power in Soviet society. What is the situation with respect to mobility?

While recent research in the USSR points up the progress achieved in making secondary education more widely available, it also demonstrates the difficulties that the children of workers and peasants encounter in obtaining a higher education, which is mandatory for entering the bourgeoisie. There is an ongoing debate between the proponents of aptitude-based selection (e.g., M. N. Rutkevich), which is justified in the name of a meritocracy (however illusory), and those who (like V. N. Shubkin) advocate egalitarian measures such as "preparatory departments at *vuzy* [higher educational institutions]" because the "selection of the best prepared for advanced schooling will inevitably mean the selection of disproportionate numbers of youngsters from families of professional strata" (Yanowitch, p. 95). I might add that the existing inequalities are even more striking if one examines the social origins and academic background of the staff at research institutes, particularly in Moscow.[2]

[1] S. S. Vasil'yev et al., *Ekonomika torgovli* (The Economics of Trade), Moscow, Politizdat, 1962, p. 158.

[2] M. N. Rutkevich and F. R. Filippov, Eds., *Vysshaya shkola kak faktor izmeneniya sotsial'noy struktury razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva* (Higher Education as a Factor in Changing the Social Structure of a Developed Socialist Society), Moscow, Nauka, 1978, pp. 250–54.

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The combination of expanded opportunities in secondary education and limited access to higher education has had perverse effects in the enterprises, where a large number of young people must be satisfied with positions that do not meet their expectations. This has produced a reexamination of personnel relations within the firm from the perspective of management science. However, while the leadership has been willing to give more freedom to directors, it has thus far refused to give the rank-and-file workers the right to elect their manager or to participate in decisions on plan directions, apparently for fear that democratization of power would undermine centralism. At most what is envisioned is allowing production teams a certain degree of autonomy. Yanowitch describes such attempts in agriculture (the short-lived Akchi experiment), but it is in industry where the system of autonomous teams has actually become more widespread—in a form which, in the guise of self-management, has ended up increasing collective control over worker discipline.[3] Yanowitch is astute in raising the problem of power within the firm, for Poland today shows what impact this issue can have on societies that find themselves under the dictatorship of a Communist party.

Educational level and power are closely linked in contemporary Soviet society, as Richard B. Dobson demonstrates in his chapters "Socialism and Social Stratification" and "Education and Opportunity" in the volume edited by Jerry Pankhurst and Michael Sacks. This analysis prompts one to ask whether the Soviet Communist Party has not become the club of the new Soviet bourgeoisie.

The Pankhurst and Sacks collection illuminates numerous other dimensions of Soviet society today with similar clarity and perception. Mark Field's contribution, for example, probes into the workings of the party. While he finds the party membership to include representatives of different social elements that compete with one another in determining priorities—which is consistent with Jerry Hough's functionalist interpretation[4]—he observes that the final decision is accepted as dogma, "as a secular faith." Hence, application of the "church or religious model" to study of the party helps explain the totalitarianism of the regime. As Field puts it, "the process of [social] differentiation is slowed by the totalistic nature of the value system" (Pankhurst and Sacks, p. 164). No group can emerge as an independent pressure group. Moreover, by reactivating nationalism, the official Soviet ideology tends to inhibit expression of frustrations and to focus resentment on foreign enemies.

But whether this "national communism" is compatible with the continued existence of diverse nationalities and religions in the Soviet Union is another question. The responses of Ralph Clem (regarding nationalities) and of Jerry Pankhurst (concerning religions) are nuanced but inconclusive. Do advances in education lead to a decline in ideology and a resurgence of ethnicity, or do social and economic inequalities among national groups cause such a resurgence? Is the persistence of religious practices a reaction against secularization and materialism, or simply a vestige of traditional society? These important questions remain open.

A key repository of Russian social traditions has been rural society. As Roy D. Laird and Ronald A. Francisco show in the Pankhurst-Sacks book, some aspects of the ancient régime endure in the countryside, even if the names have changed. For example, the family plot—which provides the basics of the peasant's livelihood—persists, and the state has simply replaced the landlord. Today, moreover, as in the past, flight to the city is the only recourse for the ambitious. Consequently, rural society has been gradually drained of its vitality, and the village is no longer the "hotbed" of insurrection that it once was.

Examination of inequalities in the Soviet Union would be incomplete without the chapters on the status of women in the USSR by Paul Sacks and Murray Yanowitch in their respective volumes. Both note the limitations on the ability of Soviet authorities to cope with long-standing customs which have established behavioral patterns that are very comfortable for the male population. To be sure, women have gained equality of access to education, which has expanded job opportunities (it also has modified female behavior, as seen in the declining birthrate). Yet, it will probably be a long time before a woman becomes a member of the Politburo.

THESE AUTHORS have unquestionably enriched our knowledge of life in the Soviet Union. They are not to blame that our curiosity remains unsatisfied on a number of counts regarding social stratification and inequality.

Field research by outsiders remains authorized only in very exceptional cases, which restricts the possibility of clarifying certain points. Nonetheless, three types of research deserve more attention than they were given in these books. Let me enumerate them in brief.

[3] "The Brigade Team," *Ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva* (Novosibirsk), No. 3, 1978, pp. 159–67; P. Bunich, "The Brigade Team," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 11, 1981; and A. Dubnov in *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), Mar. 11, 1981.

[4] See Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1977.

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1. Comparative studies. The comparative approach is the only one that permits us to sort out what is common to all industrial societies, what is characteristic of Communist regimes, and what is specific to conditions in the USSR. The reviewer knows perfectly well that this principle is easier to state than to put into practice. McAuley and Connor have shown the substantial methodological difficulties that must be overcome in order to make valid comparisons. Even when it is only the "socialist" countries that are involved, the person making the comparisons is faced with a tangled skein of hierarchic models and national traditions that calls for prudence. This explains why all too often it is necessary to settle for vague generalizations such as "all society [sic] must confront the same problem inherent in multiethnicity" (Pankhurst and Sacks, p. 59). Yet on just this point, the reader would wish for a more systematic comparison between, say, the USSR and the US in the area of ethnic homogenization.

2. Consideration of changes over the long term. Recourse to history is productive, but not because of any inevitable laws. To be sure, Maurice Allais has shown an astonishing parallelism in income distribution rights in Greece in the fourth century, B.C., Rome in 22 B.C., England in 1086, the United States in 1918, and France in 1982,[5] which might lead us to believe in some immutable process in the distribution of wealth. But it is not clear that economic growth is necessarily accompanied by increased inequality, as occurred in the early stages of capitalism. Indeed, we observe today an inverse situation: inequalities are greatest in the less-developed countries, for scarce resources cannot be redistributed easily.

Without denying the impact of objective economic conditions on social change, I would submit that history's particular contribution lies in its emphasis on the cultural constraints on change that are rooted in very slowly evolving national traditions. Recent Polish developments are instructive, for they show that, despite the existence of a certain similarity to the Soviet Union with respect to political systems and economic structures, nationalist feeling and the vitality of the Catholic Church in Poland have generated an alliance of workers and intelligentsia calling for democratic reforms. By contrast, could not one attribute the stability of the Soviet system, despite its inequalities, to a historically recognizable sort of connivance between the populace and the regime?

The authors of the books at hand all note the irreversible effects of the evolution of Soviet society, but they may have underestimated one change that I consider fundamental. The intelligentsia (in the broad sense of the term used by the Soviets), which remained on the margins of, even hostile to, power under the ancien régime, today embodies this power or is integrated into its exercise. This explains why the prevailing ideology is based on a putative meritocracy that justifies existing inequalities, just as Protestantism served as a moral justification for the accumulation of wealth in the early days of capitalism. It also explains why management science could be adopted so easily: the ideology matches the ideals of a technocracy of varied social origins.[6]

3. Investigation of social values. The prevailing ideology and political culture, which attracts many analysts' attention, should not be confused with social values. By social values, I mean the deep, underlying motives for behavior, which determine the real nature of social relations. In 19th-century Europe, the ideology of the ruling classes was never adopted by the working classes, who were imbued with a very different set of values than was the bourgeoisie.

What is the situation in the USSR today? Should we heed those like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn who say that the official ideology is dead and only a ruthless police dictatorship prevents the Russian people from breaking their chains, that the dissident intellectuals are loudly proclaiming what everyone is thinking in private? Or should we believe A. Zinoviev, who stresses that Soviet society itself has spawned the current regime because it meets that society's basic needs for security.[7]

The books analyzed here do not answer this question, because they strive to remain on the solid ground of objective research, seeking to explain social facts by social factors. In so doing, they neglect the irreplaceable contributions made by contemporary Soviet literature, whether published in the USSR or abroad. Literature is far superior to coefficients of social mobility as a means of understanding whether inequalities are perceived as such or how different managerial styles affect the attitude of the workers—in short, whether a collective self-consciousness is emerging among workers.[8]

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[5] Maurice Allais, "Inequalities and Civilization," in *Science économique et conscience de la société—Mélanges en l'honneur de Raymond Aron* (The Science of Economics and Knowledge of Society—A Collection in Honor of Raymond Aron), Vol. 2, Paris, Calman Levy, 1971.

[6] On this point, see Judith A. Merkle, *Management and Ideology*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1980.

[7] See A. Zinoviev, *L'avenir radieux*, Lausanne, l'Age d'Homme, 1978 (published in English as *The Bright Future*, New York, NY, Random House, 1981); idem, *Nous et l'Occident* (The West and Us), and *Le communisme comme réalité* (Communism as Reality), published in 1980 and 1981 respectively by l'Age d'Homme.

[8] Such matters are discussed in a broader context in A. S. Tannenbaum, *Hierarchy in Organization: An International Comparison*, San Francisco, CA, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1979.

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IF IT IS TRUE that collective utopias do not develop outside the individual but spring from his hopes for more security and especially for a better life for his children, that if these utopias relieve one of his personal responsibilities and substitute an external ideology to resolve the disorder of his contradictions, then perhaps the social sciences have a nobler mission than that of fueling "religious" war. It is to show that despite certain undeniable inequalities and differences, all men share the same fears, the same loneliness, the same desire for genuine communication in which distinctions between superior and inferior are eliminated. This would presuppose some preliminary effort at demystification, to which the present authors have contributed, perhaps involuntarily. Because of their analysis of Soviet society, it is no longer possible to believe that a system of coercion is required if one is to lessen inequalities (for inequalities were greatest during the Stalinist era), or that socialism compensates individuals solely on the basis of their work. Unfortunately, history also teaches us that the dreams of abundance and future equality fade slowly from the collective psyche, especially for those who are not benefiting from the present.

CORRECTIONS

On page 1, footnote 1 of the article "The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power" (*Problems of Communism*, November-December 1981), the date of Giles Fletcher's *Of the Russe Commonwealth* should be 1591.

* * *

The caption of the photo on page 17 of the November-December 1981 issue incorrectly identifies the Korean People's Army as belonging to North Vietnam. The KPA is the military force of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea).

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